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Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave)
New World Order of
International Intellectual Property Protection

KEITH AOKI*

INTRODUCTION

One of the biggest mistakes one can make when considering the
globalization of intellectual property law is to assume away the increasingly
contentious politics of the phenomenon. This is not to say that the emerging
politics of international intellectual property law are simple, easy to understand,
or unchanging--quite the contrary is true. However, we should resist the
understandable tendency to reach for a quick, technocratic set of Procrustean
tools that assume away the "messiness of the world" and make it seem that
concepts such as "sovereignty" and "property" should be, are, or always have
been, particularly stable constructs. Professor Fred Cate has brought together
at the Roundtable a diverse group of scholars working from a wide range of
political and ideological positions. He should be commended for avoiding the
pitfalls ofa"Jetson's Jurisprudence"' type of gathering that sanguinely implies
that the "future is so bright, we need to wear sunglasses" because of a quick
techno fix.
In the not-so-brave new world order2 following the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1989, questions about the limits of the nation-state and the market are
more important than ever. In particular, when considering developments, such
' Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law; B.F.A., 1976 Wayne State University;
M.A., 1986, Hunter College; J.D., 1990, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1993, University of Wisconsin School
of Law. Thanks to Fred Cate for inviting me to participate in this symposium as well to James Boyle, Rosemary
Coombe, Ruth Gana, and Carol Rose, whose work continues to educate, inspire and challenge me. Thanks also
to David Kennedy and other participants at the Dighton Writer's Workshop, where I presented a draft.
I. James Boyle coined the term "Jetson's Jurisprudence" which refers to a "style of legal writing [that
employs] a listing of technological marvels in the hope they will make a related set of legal rules alluringly
futuristic by association." SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY at x (1996).
2. NoAM CHOMSKY, WORLD ORDERS OLD AND NEw (1994).
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as the spread of the World Wide Web, the jurisdictional scope of national
regulatory regimes (whether specifically applicable to intellectual property per
se 3 or not, as is the case with laws regulating things like hate speech,
pornography, obscenity, privacy, or encryption) is forced to the fore. However,
the digital environment is not the only front on which questions about
extraterritorial assertions ofsovereignty are pressing. Indeed, one might look at
the rise and spread of digital communications technologies as a smaller part of
the dramatic global economic restructuring during the last half of the twentieth
century that has been referred to as globalization.'
There are three large categories that may help us structure a discussion
about the politics of international intellectual property protection. These
categories consist of issues raised when asking questions about the following:
(1) the political economy of intellectual property, considered both domestically
and globally; (2) that which James Boyle has called "Logging the Cyberforest,"5
basically, how are we to think about the intellectual "commons," or public
domain; and (3) the legitimacy of various types of cultural (in the broadest
sense) appropriation. I will briefly describe some of the issues in each of these
three areas and suggest some tentative connections pointing in the direction of
understanding the rapidly emerging politics of intellectual property law,
international and otherwise.

3. For an excellent overview ofthe technological dilemmas facing contemporary U.S. copyright law and
urging a return to its constitutionally-mandated ambit, see Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation
of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1395 (1996); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987) (examining some interpretive problems of the 1976
Copyright Act).
4. See, e.g., PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: INDUSTRIAL CHANGE INATURBULENT WORLD (1986)
(providing a useful overview from the perspective of economic geography of the economic processes referred
to as "globalization"); ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOC1ALTHEORY AND GLOBALCULTURE (1992);
GLOBAL CULTURE, NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 7 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1992) (special
volume including articles from a range of theoretical perspectives on the significance of culture within the
contemporary processes of global change); Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, The Problemof 'Globalization':
InternationalEconomic Relations,National EconomicManagementand the Formationof TradingBlocs, 21
ECON. & SOC'Y 357 (1992); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDMON OF POSrMODERNTY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE
ORIGINS OFCULTURALCHANGE(1989); Bruce Robbins, Some Versions of U.S. Internationalism,45 Soc. TEXT

97 (1995).
5. James Boyle coined this term during a presentation entitled "The Intellectual Property Grab" at the
New Approaches to International Law "fin-de-NAIL" conference at Harvard Law School (May 1996). Cf
James Boyle, A Politicsof IntellectualProperty: Environmentalismfor the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997).
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I. THE EMERGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW

First, one should note that there is a deep contradiction between the
definition of an "intellectual property right," that is, a state-backed monopoly
handed out to individuals or firms, and the popular neoliberal vision that
valorizes "privatization" and free market economics.6 Neoliberalism has three
distinctive analytical characteristics that need to be on the table before
discussing the international political economy of intellectual property.7 First,
neoliberalism makes an ideological claim about a strict division between public
and private. Second, neoliberalism entails a sort of "Forward into the Past"
elevation of freedom of contract that is similar in many ways to the Lochner-era
jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century United States.!
Third, and similarly, neoliberalism has a strong attachment to a type of
conceptual formalism that tends to characterize actors, whether individual
contracting parties or nations, as abstract and formally equal.
Central to the neoliberal vision is a strict split between the "public sphere"
(the state) and the "private sphere" (the market), with the latter privileged and
the former strictly cabined.' This is an ideological claim analogous to a
situation in which someone says, "It's not the money, it's the principle."
However, more often than not, it is the money. Here, the conceptual importance

6. See generally David C. Korten, The Mythic Victory of Market Capitalism, in THE CASE AGAINST
THE GLOBALECONOMY: ANDFORATURN TOwARDTHE LOCAL 183 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds.,
1996) [hereinafter THE CASEAGAINSTTHEGLOBAL ECONOMY]; WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR
NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997).
7. Cf David Morris, Free Trade: The GreatDestroyer,inTHECASEAGAINSTTHEGLOBALECONOMY,
supra note 6, at 218 (critiquing the politics and ideology of free trade); Tariq Banuri, Development and the
Politics of Knowledge: A Critical Interpretation of the Social Role of Modernization Theories in the
Development of the ThirdWorld, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND RESISTANCE
29 (Frederique Apffel Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990); David Slater, ContestingOccidental Visions
of the Global: The Geopolitics of Theory andNorth-South Relations, MAS ALLA DEL DERECHO [BEYOND
LAW: STORIES OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE FROM LATIN AMERICA AND AROUND THE WORLD], December
1994, at 97; ARiUN APPADURAi, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
8. Julie E. Cohen, Lochnerin Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management,"
97 MICH. L REv. (forthcoming Nov. 1998); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 279-82 (1985).
9. See Morton J. Horowitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423
(1982); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1099-1105 (1980); Joseph
William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 477-95, 528-32 (1988) (book review); see also
Richard Peet & Michael Watts, Development Theory and Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism,
69 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 227 (1993); see generally,AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 98-129 (William W. Fisher et
al. eds., 1993).
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of claiming a strict public and private split works to mask the proliferation and
interpenetration of public and private as exemplified by institutions like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of all types."0 It is interesting that the
"public" and "private" international institutions have also converged in the area
of intellectual property law. For example, the "public" international institutions
of Dumbarton Oaks, such as the United Nations, have intersected with the
World Trade Organization (WTO), which developed from the postwar Bretton
Woods "private" institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
It is also ironic that this interpenetration is simultaneously obscured by
assertions that "intellectual property rights are private rights."'"
To the extent that neoliberalism undergirds the push toward "free trade"
exemplified by multilateral agreements such as GATT, its successor-WTO,
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the formation of the
European Union, there exists an irony first pointed out early in the twentieth
century by U.S. legal realists such as Morris Cohen and Robert Hale. 3 Cohen
10. Representative organizations include the Canadian-based Rural Advancement Foundation
International (RAFI), the Women and Development Unit (WAND) in the Caribbean, Transafrica, and
organizations referred to in Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-GovernmentalOrganizations,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 623 (1992); and Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy,and Vulnerable Groups in
Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
221 (1994); see also JOHN CLARK, DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT:
THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY
ORGANIZATIONS (1991); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizationsin
InternationalDecisionmaking Institutions,WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45; Brian H. Smith, An Agenda of
Future Tasks for Internationaland Indigenous NGOs: Views From the North, 15 WORLD DEV. 87 (Supp.
1987); Carolyn Stremlau, NGO CoordinatingBodies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 15 WORLD DEV.
213 (Supp. 1987); Yash Tandon, ForeignNGOs, Uses andAbuses: An African Perspective,IFDA DOSSIER,
Apr.-June 1991, at 67, 70-72.
11. See generallyDavid C. Korten, The FailureofBretton Woods, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 20; Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATTSystem After Fifty Years: A
Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, in THE BRETrON WOODs-GATr SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 181 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & WORLD
BANK GROUP, FIFTY YEARS AFTER BREITON WOODS: THE FUTURE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK
(James M. Boughton & K. Sarwar Lateefeds., 1995); MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER
BRETTON WOODS (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); BEYOND BRETrON WOODS: ALTERNATIVES TO
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1994); 50 YEARS Is ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST
THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994); PERPETUATING
POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds.,
1994).
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods ofthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, December 15, 1993,33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) ("Recognizing
that intellectual property rights are private rights").
13. See Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
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pointed out that so-called "private property" rights of individuals and firms
were more or less state-backed delegations of public sovereignty-the ability
to "tax" future social output. 4 Furthermore, Robert Hale wrote that the state's
coercive force was similarly implicated in every "private" transaction in the
market-even state noninterference with market transactions was a form of
"public" intervention-by allowing and creating the legal rules of the game for
private property owners to coerce one another in the "private" sphere, thereby
implicating the state in underwriting "private" markets and their outcomes.
If intellectual property may be fairly characterized as ajointly produced social
product, 6 then the state-underwritten rules determining allocation of benefits
from production of that social product constitute a delegation of the sovereign's
power to "tax" via licensing, or, conversely, fair uses.
In agreements such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Rate Making
and the Revision of the PropertyConcept, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 209 (1922); For a contemporary gloss on the
continuing relevance of Robert Hale's work and Legal Realism in general see the chapter entitled "The Stakes
of Law, or Hale and Foucault!" in Duncan Kennedy's book SEXYDRESSING, ETC.: ESSAYS ONTHE POWERAND
POLmCS OF CULTURAL IDENTrY 83-125 (1994).
14. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 12-13.
15. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, supra note 13, at 471-73.
16. See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 85-86:
The [legal] realists' coercion analysis contained a substantive insight as well, an insight
into the role of legal rules. The state uses force to ensure obedience to the rules of the
game of bargaining over a joint product. To the extent that these rules affect the
outcome, forcing the parties to settle for x rather than y percent of thejoint product, the
state is implicated in the outcome. It is an author of the distribution even though that
distribution appears to be determined solely by the 'voluntary' agreement of the parties.
It is not a stretch to conceive of"intellectual property" as ajoint product, consisting of differing proportions of
preexisting works and ideas.
Furthermore, in the intellectual property area, the state is expressly implicated in conferring (or modifying)
rights. This becomes clear when one realizes the "flip-ability" value in the area of fair use. For example, is the
fair use doctrine a subsidy flowing to the public of users or consumers of copyrighted works? Or is a strong
vision of copyright a subsidy flowing to authors from the public of potential users or consumers of works? It
is far from clear that there is any determinate answer to the "efficiency" of either outcome. For a penetrating
and useful analysis of the impossibility of establishing any neutral, prepolitical default from which to assess
value, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank 1.Michelman, Are Propertyand ContractEfficient?, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv.
711 (1980). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyrightfor FunctionalExpression, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1149,
1239-40 (1998):
Even if allocative efficiency alone is considered, the desirable nature and extent of a
copyright regime are uncertain. Why, after all, should the author or publisher ofa work
own the copyright rather than just the copy itself?. ... Copyright has the effect of
'privatizing' and thereby bringing into the market goods that would otherwise be free
to all. The longstanding convention that authors have a copyright in their works deflects
attention from the fact that copyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather than
as is so often made to appear, the 'natural' way of things.
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Rights (TRIPS) component of GATT and the WTO, there are serious questions
as to what nations, regions, and classes of persons benefit from "free trade,"
whether it be in scientific textbooks, bestsellers, bytes, germ plasm, or CDs. 7
On issues as far-ranging as the impact on scientific research of restrictive
database protection laws"8 to the impact on democratic dialogic participation,
questions about the international political economy of intellectual property are
becoming harder to avoid. 9 In particular, as between the developed nations of
the North and the less developed countries of the South," increasing numbers
of scholars have been questioning whether the flow ofbenefits of international
intellectual property protection, which are part of the whole "free trade"

17. "Copyright industries [of Western Europe and North America] are not economically marginal-25
billion dollars in 1985 in Britain, 2.9 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP), greater than car
manufacturing.... [T]he United States in 1990... estimat[ed] that copyright industries contribute 5.8 per cent
of the U.S. GNP, employing almost 5 per cent of the U.S. workforce." Urvashi Butalia, The Issues at Stake:
An Indian Perspective on Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT: INEQUALITY INTHE INFORMATION
AGE 49, 52 (Philip G. Altbach ed., 1995) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT]; Alan S. Gutterman,
The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of IntellectualProperty Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
89(1993).
18. See the Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104'h
Cong. § 2 (1996); see also Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Proposal of
the United States of America on Sui Generis Protection of Databases, Geneva, May 22-24, 1996, WIPO Doc.
BCP/CEIVII2-INR/CE/VII2 (May 24, 1996) (rejected by WIPO in December 1996); World Intellectual
Property Organization, Draft WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/89
(December 20,1996) [hereinafter Draft WIPO Copyright Treaty]; Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back,
WIRED, March 1997, at 61; Denise Caruso, Global Debate Over Treaties on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1996, at D I (describing the bill that incorporated the White Paper's proposals of "failed legislation").
19. See BOYLE, supra note 1; ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY
TO PUBLIC ACCESS (1994); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects ofProperty and Subjects of Politics:Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1853 (1991); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law
and Social Diaglogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin
Board Operators, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215
(1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996);
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography ofAuthorship,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
GlobalArea, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998).
20. See Andrew Pollack, A Cyberspace Front in a Multicultural War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at D 1,
featuring a map of what regions of the world are "wired" provided by the Internet Society, in which most of SubSaharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa, is unconnected to the Internet. The map's title reads
"Connected, but Not Communicating" and its captions state:
North and South America both use Latin alphabets, making computer communication
between them relatively easy.... There are few computer networks in Africa, and the
large number of dialects, languages, and alphabets makes electronic communication
difficult .... Most of Europe can communicate with Latin script. China and other Asian
countries require more complicated character sets than the Internet allows.
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package, may be skewed to the advantage of the economies, cultures, and
nations of the North." To the extent that the countries of the North have
developed bifurcated economies with large wealth gaps between rich and poor,
the concerns of the nations of the South fold into pockets of Third World-like
immiseration within the First World.2

21. See VANDANA SHIvA, BIopiRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1996) [hereinafter
BIoPIRAcY]; VANDANA

SHIVA, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND:

PERSPECTIVE ON BIODIvERsrrY AND

BIOEcHNoLooY (1993); COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT, supranote 17; BOYLE, supra note 1; INTELLEcTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK (Tom Greaves ed., 1994); JACK R.
KLOPPENBERG, JR., FIRSTTHE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY (1988); Ruth L.

Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and
Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315 (1996) [hereinafter Gana, The Myth of Development]; Ruth L. Gana,
Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalizationof Intellectual
Property,24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1995) [hereinafter Has CreativityDied in the Third World?];
Darrell Addison Posey, Intellectual Property Rights: What is the Position of Ethnobiology?, 10 J.
ETHNOBIOLOGY 93 (1990); Darrell Posey, Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for
Indigenous Knowledge, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1990, at 13; see also Judith C. Chin & Gene A.
Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade 10506 (National Bureau ofEconomic Research
Working Paper No. 1040, 1990); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics ofIntellectualPropertyRights
and the GA7T. A View From the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 254 (1989); J. H. Reichman,
Intellectual Property in InternationalTrade: Opportunitiesand Risks of a GA 7T Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 861-63 (1989); Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating Neo-Liberal
Reforms: Free Trade as a Conditioning Framework, (May 27-29, 1994) (unpublished paper presented to the
International Conference on Economic Integration and Public Policy: NAFTA, the European Union and
Beyond, York University, Toronto. "The new trading arrangements effectively remove many economic and
social policy objectives from democratic consideration. These policy changes are directed to inhibit
governments from engaging in interventionist policies in particular in the area of export promotion and import
protection.")
22. Saskia Sassen, On ConcentrationandCentrality in the GlobalCity, in WORLD CITIES INAWORLD
SYSTEM 63, 71 (Paul Knox & Peter J. Taylor eds., 1995):
[W]e are... [s]eeing the formation ofa transterritorial 'centre' constituted via digital
highways and intense economic transactions.... New York, London, and Tokyo could
be seen as constituting such a transterritorial terrain of centrality.... And at the limit
we may see terrains of centrality that are disembodied, that lack any territorial correlate,
that are in the electronically generated space we call cyberspace.... One question here
is whether the type of spatial organization characterized by dense strategic nodes spread
over the broader region does or does not constitute a new form of organizing the
territory of the 'centre', rather than, as in the more conventional view, an instance of
suburbanization or geographic dispersal.
See also SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991); HERBERT I. SCHILLER,
INFORMATION INEQUALITY: THE DEEPENING SOCIAL CRISIS IN AMERICA xvi (1996):

[Tihe information crisis-denial of access and debased messages and images-deepens
social inequality and intensiflies] the general social crisis. . . . [Tihe media
informational sector... [h]as become a major site ofemployment and income (domestic
and international), and also provides an increasingly integrated symbolic environment
from which the nation derives its ideas, values, expectations.... The character and
quality of message and image flow, therefore, is a crucial terrain ofcontestation in the
time ahead.
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In particular, disparities between North and South23 are most pronounced
as to the question of "free trade" and its relationship with the idea of
"development."24 The question facing the postwar architects of the world
economic order was, Now that colonialization has ended, how do we move
on?25 In the 1960s, development of the Third World was seen as crucial, and
the means whereby development would occur was via technological transfers.26

23. Anthony D. Taibi, RacialJustice in the Age of the Global Economy: Community Empowerment
and GlobalStrategy, 44 DUKE L.J. 928, 975 n. 118 (1995):
[T]he disparity between the richest countries in the world (bearing in mind that at least
halfof our people are not so rich) and the poorest in terms of income and access to basic
resources (safe drinking water, sufficient caloric intake, medical attention and
sanitation, education, and so on) is about 150 to t....
The North with about one-fourth
ofthe world's population, consumes 70% of the world's energy, 75% ofits metals, 85%
of its wood and 60% of its food.
(citing Human Development Report 1992, U. N. Development Programme, at 34 (1992)).
24. See generallyReportof the Working Group ofGovernmentalExperts on the Right to Development,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1489 (1982); U.N. Declaration on the Right to
Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986);
CHRISTOPHERCHASE-DUNN, GLOBALFORMATION: STRUCTURES OFTHE WORLD-ECONOMY (1989); ARTURO

EscoBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THRD WORLD (1995);
KATHY MCAFEE, STORM SIGNALS: STRUCTURAL ADJUsTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE

CARIBBEAN (1991); Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of a

Global Consultation, 13 HuM. RTS. Q. 322 (1991); Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income
Distribution and the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social
Development, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996); Arturo Escobar, Reflections on
'Development': Grassroots Approaches and Alternative Politics in the Third World, 24 FUTURES 411
(1992); The Myth of Development, supra note 21; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International
EconomicLaw: Locatingthe Latinas/osin the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (19961997); James C. N. Paul, The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning & Importance, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 235 (1992); Richard Warren Perry, Rethinking the Right to Development: After the Critique of
Development, After the Critiqueof Rights, 18 LAW & POL'Y 225 (1996); L. Amede Obiora, Beyond the
Rhetoric of a Right to Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 355 (1996).
25. See Elliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature& A Critiqueof "Scholars
in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1977); John Henry Merryman, ComparativeLaw andSocial
Change: On the Origins,Style, Decline & Revival ofthe Law andDevelopment Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP.
L. 457 (1977); Robert Seidman, Law and Development: A GeneralModel, 6 LAW& Soc'Y REv. 311 (1972);
David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisisin Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062.
26. See Perry, supranote 24, at 236-37:
To understand the post-War development project, we must situate it historically
alongside the Marshall Plan, its "foreign aid" cousin, whose goal was to counter the
Soviet Union's menace to the United States' primacy in Europe through strategic
infusion of U.S. capital for the redevelopment of Europe's economic infrastructure.
Indeed, the development framework for North-South geopolitical relations was no less
integral to the new post-World War II world order than was the East-West strategic
confrontation that we know as the Cold War.... Arturo Escobar... argues that, from
the late 1940's,. . .paleo-colonial notions of development underwent a paradigm shift
as the Truman-era development agenda engendered its logical counterpart, a new
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An explicit assumption of development theories of this period was that the
United States and Western European nations achieved a high level of
development because of their intellectual property systems that fostered
innovation; therefore, what worked for the West should work for the rest." One
main push during this period was for the countries of the developing world to
adopt intellectual property regimes based on transplanted U.S. and European
models; technological advancement would take care of itself." Unfortunately,
development did not occur on this unilinear model, and during the 1970s,
development of the sort that aimed to make the Third World look like the First
World received increasing criticisms as uneven development persisted.2 During
the 1980s and 1990s, structural adjustment policies advanced by the IMF and
conceptualization of underdevelopment ....The Truman-em development agenda
would set the conceptual framework, the ground-rules, according to which the First and
Second Worlds would contend for hegemony over the newly christened Third.
27. Id at 237-38:
The dualist model of development/modernization theory depicts the "problem" of
underdevelopment as a matter to be remedied by a benign process through which the
"modem world", together with the "advanced" ("Westernized," "modernized,") elite
sectors of "backward" societies collaborate to "overcome" those societies' recalcitrant
"traditionalism" that stood as a barrier to their progress. One implication of this
conceptual framing was that persevering resistance to Western hegemony - in either its
classically colonialist or neocolonialist forms - now could be marginalized not simply
as anti-Western, but also as anti-modem, as a stubborn obstacle in the one-way street
of progress, as anti-development.
See also Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21, at 349 n.39.
The theory that development is unilinear is an outgrowth of Darwinian thought which
holds that progress is inevitable. According to this theory, poor countries of the world
are simply replicas of developed countries at earlier stages in the[ir] development. With
time, developing countries would go through their own industrial revolution and
eventually achieve a level of development comparable todeveloped countries.
Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsideringthe Copyright and PatentPower, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 97 (1993).
28. Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21, at 346 n.24:
The debate about the role of intellectual property is usually framed around the question
of whether protection for intellectual property rights is a prerequisite for development.
However, this question is not helpful unless the fundamental issue of differences in
values that underlie political, social, and legal institutions in countries is factored into
the models of protection for intellectual property.
29. See, for example, the work ofDependency theorists who critiqued the unilinear model ofdevelopment,
arguing that over rapid industrialization led to underdevelopment, ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND
UNDERDEVELoPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL STUDIES OFCHILEANDBRAZIL( 1967); KErrH GRIFFIN,

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA (1969); FRANCES STEWART, TECHNOLOGY AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1977); IMMANUEL WAU.ERSTEN, THE MODERN WORI.D-SYSTEM (1974). But see
ERNESTO LAcLAU, PoLITCS AND IDEOLOGY IN MARXIST THEORY: CAPITALISM, FASCISM, POPULISM (1977);

MARGARET C. SNYDER & MARY TADESSE, AFRICAN WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT: A HISTORY: THE STORY
OF THE AFRICAN TRAINING AND RESEARCH CENTER FOR WOMEN OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC

COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (1995).

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:11

the World Bank tended to encourage privatized development."
By the early 1990s, with the enactment of TRIPS, Third World countries
might be thought of as being coerced intojoining GATT, which literally said to
Third World countries: If you want to export your goods, agricultural and
otherwise, you must protect the intellectual properties of other nations. Thus,
the cotton that passes out of Malaysia at one dollar per pound returns as a tshirt bearing the trademarked image ofMickey Mouse or Bart Simpson selling
for twenty-five dollars.3' Under the ideological banner of "free trade," the
intellectual property regimes of the developed nations were given expanded
reach-in other words, rules that purportedly were meant to encourage and
protect creative expression and scientific innovation were now put in place,
giving owners the legal means to reach extraterritorially into Third World
countries to prevent unauthorized use.32 TRIPS also places important
constraints on the sovereignty of nations ofthe developing world to implement
innovation schemes based on local and regional considerations, factors which
may differ drastically from country to country and industry to industry. Ruth
Gana writes:
Given the history of the international intellectual property
system, the notion that either the pre- or post-TRIPS
multilateral system is based upon consensus is still a myth as

30. 50 YEARS Is ENOUGH: THECASEAGAINSTTHE WORLD BANK ANDTIE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, supranote 11; PERPETUATING POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD,

supra note 11; Victor L. Urquidi, Reconstruction vs. Development: The IMF and the World Bank, in THE
BRETTON WOODS-GATr SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 30 (Orin Kirshner ed.,

1996).
31. Keith Aoki, The Stakes ofIntellectual PropertyLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE, 259 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). See also Aoki, supranote 19; Rosemary J. Coombe, The
CulturalLife of Things: AnthropologicalApproachesto Law and Society in the Conditionsof Globalization,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 791 (1995).
32. Gana, The Myth ofDevelopment, supranote 21. See alsoJoel R. Reidenberg, GoverningNetworks
andRule-Makingin Cyberspace, in BORDERS INCYBERSPACE 84 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1996);
Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual PropertyRights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505
(1997); Dan L. Burk, Federalismin Cyberspace,28 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (1996); David R. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE U.S. § 402 (1987) (a state's "jurisdiction to
prescribe" may be exercised with respect to "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that
is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests."); Larry Kramer,

Vestiges ofBeale: ExtraterritorialApplicationof American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 ("the world
in which a presumption against extraterritoriality made sense is gone."); Note, Constructing the State

Extraterritorially: JurisdictionalDiscourse, the National Interest and TransnationalNorms, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1273 (1990).
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far as developing countries are concerned. Those countries that
will feel the brunt of its provisions include both the African
countries that remain on the periphery of the international
market and the emerging economies in Asia whose markets are
attractive to foreign investors from the developed countries....
[T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential
threat ofeconomic ostracism, what could not be accomplished
through negotiations independent of the international economic
framework.... Copyright and patent laws will continue to
extract exorbitant costs from developing countries in exchange
for access to literary works, computer programs or other
technology.... [G]iven the values reflected in the current
intellectual property system, values which are deemed
"universal" yet are clearly not, there is no assurance that the
current framework will benefit developing countries in any
significant way.3 3
With regard to the long-term effects of growing disparities between the
developed world and the developing world on questions of technology transfer,
Jerome Reichman has been prescient. Professor Reichman asks us to consider
whether we are in control of our institutions or whether they are in control of
us.34 By asking us to take North and South distributional consequences of
intellectual property regimes seriously, Reichman asks us to consider the long-

33. Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21, at 334-35. See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for
Developing Countriesunder the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (1996); See also Marci
A. Hamilton, The TRIPSAgreement: Imperialistic,Outdatedand Overprotective,29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 613 (1996); Samuel A. Oddi, The InternationalPatent System and Third World Development: Reality
or Myth?, 1997 DUKE L.J. 831; Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS- NaturalRights and a "PoliteForm ofEconomic
Imperialism," 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996); Sam Ricketson, The Future of the Traditional
Intellectual PropertyConventions in the Brave New World of Trade-RelatedIntellectual PropertyRights,
26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 872 (1995).
34. See J. H. Reichman, Chartingthe Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy: Premisesfor a
RestructuredInternationalIntellectual PropertySystem, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995); J. H.
Reichman, Compliance With the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 363 (1996); J. H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Proceduresof the TRIPSAgreement,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335 (1997); J. H. Reichman, From Free Tradersto Fair Followers: GlobalCompetition
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997) [hereinafter FairFollowers];see also
J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospectsfor
IntellectualPropertyOwners in an IntegratedWorld Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
171 (1993); J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of IntellectualPropertyProtection under the
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995) [hereinafter Universal Minimum
Standards].
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term effects of international intellectual property regimes that are now being put
in place. Importantly, he recharacterizes the stakes of intellectual property
protection as involving a struggle between clashing visions. On one hand,
Reichman sees the nations and firms of the developed world promoting
anticompetitive, maximalist policies under the ideological banner of "free (or
fair) trade."35 On the other hand, the interests of the developing and least
developed nations of the Third World may be advanced by either promoting
procompetitive intellectual property strategies on the national or regional level,
or what Reichman refers to as "fair following," involving "legitimate rights of
local firms to reverse-engineer unpatented foreign technologies by honest
means."36 With an eye toward long-term stabilization and relative equalization
of the field of competition among the nations along the spectrum from North to
South, developed to developing to least developing nations regarding economic
relations, Reichman urges us to look critically upon the:
[P]rotectionist appetites of . . . powerful industrial
combinations that have successfully captured the legislative
and administrative exponents of trade and intellectual property
policies... [and] where the interests of both consumers and
small or medium-sized innovators are held hostage to the
political influence of oligopolistic combinations that use
intellectual property rights to expand market power."
A specific example of this overreaching is the proposed (but rejected, for
now at least) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Database
Protection Treaty of 1996.1' The economically formidable U.S. copyright and
information industries recently lobbied Congress, the Commerce Department,
international bodies such as WIPO (a subagency ofthe United Nations), and the

35. On the free trade-fair trade distinction, see generally Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The
Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 61 (1996).
In some ways, the arguments that undergird both the free trade and the fair trade positions in terms of upwardly
harmonizing the international trade framework carry less persuasive power in the intellectual property area than
in the environmental and labor rights area.
36. FairFollowers, supra note 34, at 92.
37. Id. at 17, 25.
38. Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997). See also
Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases
to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CR/NR/DC6 (Aug. 6, 1996); J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REv. 51 (1997).
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WTO to expand statutorily the content of both national and international
protections for intellectual property. When WIPO met in Geneva in December
1996, the copyright, media, and information industry representatives behind the
Commerce Department's White Paper of 1995 sought to implement globally
five problematic protections of otherwise uncopyrightable information within
databases39 advocated in the failed White Paper.40 Because of vocal protests
from the international scientific and legal communities, who viewed the
proposed Treaty as potentially disastrous for scientific research, the proposed
Database Protection Treaty was rejected, and the White Paper-like proposals
were taken under consideration for further discussion by WIPO.4' What is
notable is that when the U.S. copyright and information industries could not get
what they wanted on the domestic level, they sought to make a supranational
end run, a tactic which has had some prior success with the TRIPS component

39. The 5 significant changes in domestic U.S. Copyright law that the failed 1995 White Paper advocated
(which were advocated to WIPO in December 1996) were: (1) subjecting transitory or temporary copies in a
computer Random Access Memory to the copyright owner's exclusive right to authorize reproductions thereby
making RAM copies into infringing copies; (2) treating digital transmissions of copyrighted works as
distributions to the public, thereby subjecting Interet Service Providers to a strict liability contributory
infringement scheme; (3) imposing criminal sanctions as the penalty for tampering with copy-protection or
management of digital texts; (4) curtailing the ability of states to make exceptions or limits on the exclusive
rights of copyright owners, thereby modifying the "fair use" defense by instituting a problematic commercial
and noncommercial use distinction and limiting first sale privileges; and (5) allowing copyright owners to
challenge the manufacture and sale of technology or services that could circumvent copy-management or
protection technology. In addition, the United States wanted WIPO to create a suigeneris legal protection for
the contents of databases. On the December 1996 WIPO discussions, see Peter H. Lewis, 160 Nations Meet
to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1986, at Al. See also James Love, Archive of
WIPO DatabaseProtectionMaterials(visited Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/listproc/info-policynotesk> (assembled by James Love of Taxpayer Assets Project and Consumer Project on Technology);
Samuelson, supra note 38, at 372-73.
40. See Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions ofthe Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CR/NR/DC6, art. 10 (August 30,
1996); Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the
Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright
and Neighboring Rights Questions, WIPO Doe. CR/NRIDC4, art. 7(1), 13, 14 (August 30, 1996). See
generally Samuelson, supra note 38.
41. See Draft WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 18. See also Samuelson, supra note 18; Caruso,
supranote 18 (describing the bill that incorporated the White Paper's proposals as "failed legislation").
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of GATT."
Moving away from concerns about corporate ethnobotanists rifling through
the shaman's bag in search of pharmaceutical miracles or designing legal
protections for elections swirling globally in cyberspace, consider the printed
book, a more quotidian item from the Age of Gutenberg,43 and how maximalist
visions of internationalized copyright may negatively affect the educational and
research capacity of nations in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, or Latin America."
During the nineteenth century, the United States was considered to be the

42. See Final Act Embodying the Results ofthe Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal
Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mulitilateral Trade Negotians Done at Marrakesh
on April 15, 1994, vol. 1; Annex IC Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Legal
Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done at
Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). For the U.S. ratification of the TRIPS component
of the WTO Agreements, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 101-103, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994). See also Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 34; Has Creativity Died in the Third
World?, supra note 21.
43. See Philip G. Altbach, The Subtle Inequalities of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 17, at 1, 2, 5:
There is, in reality, a difference between a Mickey Mouse Watch, a Hollywood film, or
even a computer software program, on the one hand, and a scientific treatise, on the
other. Textbooks, technical reports, and research volumes are subject to the same
copyright regulations as a novel by James Clavell. Those who control the distribution
of knowledge treat all intellectual property equally-and are perfectly happy to deny
access to anyone who cannot pay.... [lI]t is important to realize that the international
knowledge system is highly unequal, and it can be argued that those who are in control
of the system-and specifically copyright arrangements-have a special responsibility to
assist in the intellectual and educational development of the Third World. There is a
kind of OPEC of knowledge in which a few rich nations and a small number of
multinational publishers have a great deal of control over how and where books are
published, the prices of printed materials, and the nature of international exchange of
knowledge.
44. HenryM. Chakava, InternationalCopyrightandAfrica: An UnequalExchange, in COPYRIGHTAND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 18:
One can only assume that African countries have chosen to sign [onto the Berne
Convention] because they believe this will facilitate the flow of knowledge from the
North to their own countries.... [T]he reality of the situation is that these rights holders
[in the North] do not appear keen to extend printing licenses to African publishers.
Instead they are using copyright as a weapon to maintain the dependency relations that
currently exit. The African signatories have arrogated themselves the role ofcollecting
copyright fees from their own people and remitting these to the owners in the North.
This has serious repercussions for the cost of education, and for the future of the
education industries in Africa. When Africa finally [achieves] the necessary economic,
production and distribution infrastructures... to permit proper commercial publishing
to emerge . . . [Africa] will replace Asia as the battleground for piracy and other
copyright infringement battles presently raging in the rest of the world.
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"Barbary Coast" of intellectual property. 5 The United Nations Educational,
Social & Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reports that in 1993, while "Africa
ha[d] 12% of the world's population, it produc[ed] only 1.2% of its books, and
that this percentage is declining.... [Furthermore, Africa] controls only about
0.4% of the world's intellectual property."' By comparison, North America,
which has roughly five percent of the world's population, produces thirteen
percent ofthe world's books. Similarly, papers,journals, magazines, and "80%
of the world's knowledge industries are based in the North [where their output]
is copyrighted."4 7 There is a strong case to be made that African nations should
be able to enact local copyright laws that allow for compulsory licensing,
expanding and strengthening rules regarding exemptions for education and
research purposes, simplifying copyright assignment clauses, and working
toward a multilateral reduction in copyright term duration.4 ' Admittedly, the
tenor of the U.S. copyright industry's interpretation of TRIPS runs counter to
these sorts of proposals, but at the very least, one should consider the
importance of books and journals, particularly educational and scientific texts
and in terms of generating local innovation, to the developing and least
developed countries. Philip Altbach writes:
Copyright, after all, is a moral and ideological concept as well
as a legal and economic one. There is no recognition that the

45. Altbach, supra note 43, at 8:
One of the most egregious violators of copyright in the nineteenth century was the
United States, which felt, probably incorrectly, that it could build up its domestic
publishing industry most effectively by freely reprinting works from abroad while
protecting the rights of domestic authors. Once American publishing was well
developed, the United States became a defender of copyright. Until the 1960s, the
Soviet Union had a similar perspective-international copyright was violated as the
country used knowledge from abroad for its own purposes. China had a similar
perspective up to the 1990s and has only recently joined the international copyright
system. Nations must see copyright as in their best national interest before they become
fully supportive of it.
See also AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NNETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1960).

46. Chakava, supra note 44, at 13, 17, 19.
47. Id.at 17.
48. See generally id.; Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21; Amadio A. Arboleda,
Distribution: The Neglected Link in the Publishing Chain, in PUBLISHING iN THE THIRD WORLD:
KNOWLEDGE AND DEVELOPMENT 42, 44 (Philip G. Altbach ed., 1985) ("Even meeting the basic needs for
achieving mass distribution, i.e., adequate book manufacturing equipment, distribution equipment, display
equipment, a distribution system and plan (including transportation), necessary capital, an adequate editorial
and production staff, and tax relief, is beyond the capabilities of publishers in most developing countries.").
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legacy of colonialism and the power of multinationals has, to
a significant extent, created the current highly unequal world
knowledge system. It is, of course, much easier for the
"haves" to cling to the economic and legal system that has
given them a virtual monopoly over the world's knowledge
products than to recognize that we live in an interdependent
world and that the Third World desperately needs access to
knowledge and technology.... [These needs] are not limited
to the poor countries of the developing world. For example,
Moscow's famed Lenin Library is no longer purchasing any
scientificjournals from the West because there is no allocation
of "hard currency" funds. Few, if any, other libraries or
academic institutions in the former Soviet Union are able to
obtain access to key books and journals in the current
circumstances. The situation is even more desperate for many
sub-Saharan African countries, where purchases of books and
journals from abroad ceased several years ago because of lack
of funds. . . . The end of conflicts in such countries as
Cambodia, Laos, Uganda, Angola, Ethiopia and others has
permitted them to turn their attention to the rebuilding of
educational and library systems-and there is a desperate need
49
for books of all kinds.
One troubling example of the unidirectional drain of intellectual resources
from the Third World is the research area of African oral literatures and
traditions. These cultural stories and practices do not belong to any individual;
instead, they are the cultural property of ethnic groups or nations. However, as
soon as researchers (with most coming from the North) collect this cultural and
traditional material, and copyright the resulting compilation, no one can use the

49. Altbach, supra note 43, at 7.
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material without the researcher's permission." The pattern is becoming
depressingly familiar: resources flow out of the Southern regions and are
transformed by Northern entrepreneurial authors and inventors into intellectual
properties, which in many cases are priced so high that the people from whom
such knowledge originated cannot afford to license them.
It is important that intellectual property policy, whether on the domestic or
international level, should not be driven solely by the maximalist imperative.
The maximalist logic seems to be that if a little bit of protection is good, then
a lot will be better, leading us to levels of intellectual property protection
spiraling ever upward. There is no consideration of the idea that traditional
intellectual property law has been concerned with striking a balance between
society's interests and those of individual creators. Reichman importantly
reminds us that traditionally intellectual property policy has sought to strike this
balance between incentives or rewards to creators and the interests of users,
consumers and competitors-the public. Furthermore, by ignoring the
importance of this idea of a necessary balance and opting for over-protection,
we may "misallocate... scarce resources devoted to research and development
and... reduce the efficiencies that flow from reverse-engineering and from
cumulative, sequential innovation generally."'" Also in the international arena,
policies that produce oligopolistic barriers block entry for firms in the nations
of the least-developed and developing world.
As legal regimes ofthe world's developed nations steadily expand the scope
of property rights in information, many decision makers begin opting for
multilateral and supranational intellectual property regimes. As transnational
intellectual property regimes begin setting minimum standards of protection,
traditional territorial and political notions of sovereignty are eroded. This
occurs in large part because entities holding increasingly large blocks of
intellectual property rights are not nations, but instead are "private"
multinational corporations. The irony is that such entities must then assert the

50. Chakava, supra note 44, at 20.
Africa's leading fiction writers are published in the North, mostly in Britain, France and
the United States. The majority ofthem sprang into prominence in the 1950s and 1960s
when the African publishing industry was either at its nascent stage, or did not exist at
all. They continue to be published in those centers because local African industries are
not yet sufficiently developed to provide maximum exposure to their
works.... [This
is] a sad reality for the 34 African countries that ascribe to the Berne Convention and
constitute the largest members from any continent.
Id. at 19.
51. Fair Followers,supra note 34, at 24.
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"sovereignty" of domestic intellectual property laws to underwrite their
ownership claims. 2 It is on the level of national sovereignty that countries of
the least-developed and developing world may be able to make strong arguments
for a procompetitive interpretation of TRIPS. It is here that Reichman argues
for striking a balance among producers, competitors, users and consumers, with
a view towards long-term stabilization, rather than short-term maximum
returns, to an increasingly concentrated small number of transnational
producers based in the nations of the developed world.
II. THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AND PROTECTING
AN INTELLECTUAL "COMMONS"

A recent article by Michael Heller entitled, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the TransitionFrom Marx to Markets" is a very
good place to begin looking at some ofthe questions about how many and what
types of intellectual property rights we want to confer, as well as the equally
important question of what things do we not want to "propertize" or
"thingify."' 4 To begin, Heller discusses Garrett Hardin and his famous
evocation of the Tragedy of the Commons" that arises when too many people
have a privilege to use a resource and no one user has a legal right to exclude
any other user-the result is over consumption and depletion of the resource.
By contrast, to Heller, a "Tragedy of the Anticommons" occurs when "too
many owners hold[] rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse.""
One of the examples Heller uses to demonstrate the "Tragedy of the
Anticommons" is post-1989 Moscow storefronts that remain empty, even as

52. Aoki, supra note 19.
53. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin the Transitionfrom Marx to
Markets, 11 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998); see also Duncan Kelly & Frank Michelman, Are Propertyand
ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980).
54. Legal realist Felix Cohen gave an example of"thingification" in 1935:
Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations if
we don't believe in angels? To be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds, corporate
transactions, etc.... But this does not give us the right to hypostatize, to "thingify" the
corporation, and to assume that it travels about from State to State as mortal men travel.
Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 811 (1935).
55. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Heller, supra note 53,
at 624-25; see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347 (1967)
(discussing how private property rights are one solution to the "Tragedy of the Commons" insofar as they
require users to internalize the costs of consuming the resource).
56. Heller, supra note 53, at 624.
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flimsy metal kiosks proliferate." Underlining the contingency of our property
classifications, Heller identifies three key elements of socialist property law that
became problems as Soviet law transitioned to a market economy: (1) a
hierarchy of property, placing state property with the most protection and socalled "private property" with the least protection;58 (2) the objects of greatest
economic value, such as land, were defined as unitary and said to belong to "the
people;"59 and (3) there were divided, multiple, and overlapping rights to control
socialist property that resided in various levels of the state bureaucracy -no
individual "owner" was assigned to a particular object. The problem was that
too many "owners" possessed a "right to exclude" related to a particular object
of property such that it remained underutilized."
A crucial difference between Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" and
Heller's "Tragedy of the Anticommons" is what happens with the "right to
exclude."62 In the commons situation, part of the problem is that no one has the

57. Id. at 631.
The working hypothesis in this section is that private property emerges less successfully
in resources that begin transition [from a socialist to a market economy] with the most
divided ownership. In such resources, poorly performing anticommons property is most
likely to appear and persist. In contrast, private property emerges more successfully in
resources that begin transition with a single owner holding a near-standard bundle of
market legal rights.
58. Id. at 628-29.
Socialist law erected a hierarchy based on the level of protection afforded property held
by different owners. At top was socialist property, which received the most protection.
Next came cooperative property, which received similar but somewhat less protection.
Personal property received still less protection. The residual category of private
property was abolished altogether in the Soviet Union; the rest of the socialist world
gave it the least protection from taxation, regulation, and confiscation.
59. Id. at 629.
[A]II productive assets were in principle "unitary" and belonged to the "people as a
whole," socialist law did not delineate the ordinary physical boundaries.... In the early
years of the transition from socialism, private owners and public officials often could not
answer the question, "Who controls the land on which we stand?"
60. Id. ("Instead of assigning an owner to each object, socialist law created a complex hierarchy of
divided and coordinated rights in the objects it identified [that could be] loosely comparefed] to Western forms
of trust ownership.").
61. Professor Heller gives many other examples ofanticommons property, such as the Sergeant Preston
of the Yukon-Quaker Oats one-square inch of land giveaway in the 1950s. Other examples include restrictive
covenants in deeds or land use permitting processes where multiple parties exercise what could be thought of
as the "right to exclude" certain types of development. See id. at 679 n.259.
62. Id.
[Flour categories of rights-holders emerged during the transition. Each of these
categories of rights-holders are 'owners' in the sense that they could block other rights(a) Owners .... (b) Users, .. . (c)
holders from using a store without permission ....
The Moscow storefront thus meets
Balance-sheet Holders,... [and] (d) Regulators ....
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right to exclude, thereby giving rise to over-utilization and depletion. By
contrast, with the anticommons situation, too many parties independently
possess the right to exclude, giving rise to under-utilization-tragedy of the
anticommons.63 In one situation, the "bundle of sticks" comprising property
rights lacks a significant "stick"--no one party is able to exclude any other
party from the "commons." In the other situation, the significant "stick" (the
right to exclude) is broken up and held by many parties-any of whom may
exercise the right. Many traditionalaspects of U.S. intellectual property law
seem to intuitively reflect Professor Heller's observations about the problem of
"too many" potential owners."

my definition of anticommons property, that is, a property regime in which multiple
owners hold rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.
Id at 636-39.
63. Importantly, one should note that Professor Heller states that the anticommons is not always tragic-he
points out that "Elinor Ostrom has shown that people may be able to manage non-private property efficiently
by developing and enforcing stable systems of informal norms." Id. at 674-75 (citing to ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTruTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58-102 (1990)).

Additionally, Professor Heller points out that:
[S]ome resources may be most efficiently held as anticommons.... [Including] familiar
property rights arrangements, such as a scheme of restrictive covenants in a residential
subdivision... [T]o the extent that creating such a scheme increases property values
more than it imposes negative externalities, the developer's decision to convert raw land
to anticommons form can be an efficiency-enhancing move.
Id. (citing Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Customs, Commerce and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CH. L. REv. 711 (1986)).
64. For example, consider the statutory rules and case law surrounding the works-made-for-hire doctrine,
that seeks to clarify and consolidate ownership rights for commissioned works and works made as part of an
employment relationship. In the absence of such rules, one could imagine an anticommons situation. See 17
U.S.C § 201 (1996):
In the case of work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.
See also the definition of "work made for hire" at 17 U.S.C. § 101(1996); Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); cf Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that
provisions of employee benefits and tax treatment are the most important factors in determining whether a
person is an independent contractor or employee).
Consider also the Joint Works category, for which a deliberate intent must be shown to have created a
collaborative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) ("A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."); see also Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting From
Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REy. 257 (1996).
Alternately, in terms ofcreating potential "anticommons" situations in the patent area, consider the "shop
right" doctrine, that grants a nonexclusive license to the employer of an inventor who comes up with a
patentable invention. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW at § 2g[l] (1992) ("Ifan employee uses his employer's resources to conceive of or reduce to
practice an invention, the employer acquires a 'shop right', a nonexclusive royalty-free, non-transferable license
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Heller mentions how he and his colleague, Rebecca Eisenberg, are working
on an anticommons analysis of how expanding the scope of patentable subject
matter to include basic biomedical research may lead to the development of
fewer useful pharmaceutical products-an underutilization of the information
or knowledge. 5 At the very least, one can imagine a variety of licensing
schemes in which multiple licensees or holdouts might exercise their licenses to
exclude other researchers working along similar lines involving patented
technology. Alternately, one might conceive of a situation that conceptually
resembles the 1987 Supreme Court case, Hodel v. Irving' (which Heller
describes as a spatial anticommons), in which a formerly unitary patent right
to a pioneer technology becomes so splintered that the development of the

to make and use the invention."); see also Womack v. Durham Pecan Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 962,219 U.S.P.Q.
1153 (5th Cir. 1983).
Also, consider the geographic scope of a common-law trademark-it is possible for multiple trademark
proprietors to have exclusive rights in the same mark in different regions of the country. See DONALD S.
CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at § 5E[2] (1992):
At common law, a manufacturer or merchant's trademark rights geographically
extended only to markets in which he sold the trademark bearing-goods.
Notwithstanding the first use priority rule, a second user could obtain exclusive
trademark rights by adopting and using in good faith in a remote market a mark similar
or identical to a first user's.
See also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90 (1918). The federal Lanham Act addresses this problem by instituting a national registry for
trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a) (1997) (providing for registrations for trademarks used in commerce),
and (b) (providing for registration of trademarks intended to be used in commerce).
65. See Heller, supra note 53.
In a forthcoming article [Upstream Patents and Downstream Products: A Tragedy
of the Anticommons?], Rebecca Eisenberg and I use an anticommons analysis to show
how increased patentability of basic biomedical research may lead to the development
of fewer useful pharmaceutical products .... Another intellectual property example
occurs in the emerging multimedia field, in which multiple ownership and licensing
requirements could create a 'Brady Bunch anticommons.' Use of The BradyBunch has
required agreement from each of the actors portraying Brady kids (and their parents,
while the actors were still minors), the Brady parents, and the Brady housekeeper,
Alice-as is typical of licensing agreements for such shows.
Id.at 679 n.259.
66. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); see also Babbitt v. Yuopee, 117 S.Ct. 727 (1997).
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relevant technology is seriously hindered.67 Or one might imagine an impasse,
such as the case with the development of radio technology prior to World War
I, where, two economic competitors held key components to radio technology
and neither would cross-license to the other.6" The impasse was ultimately
broken by the U.S. government which needed radio technology in the war effort
and managed to force the parties holding blocking patents to work together.
Similarly, granting or expanding proprietary rights in fundamental aspects
of things such as the basic information in databases69 or functionally necessary

67. Theoretically, at least, the doctrines of denying protection to utilitarian aspects of useful goods and
the dichotomy between idea and expression in copyright law work to ensure that the basic ideas remain
nonproprietary. Similarly in trademark law, the idea of aesthetic functionality (or functionality in the design
patent area) works to keep certain basic design features from becoming proprietary. And the unpatentability
of mathematical formula, naturally occurring substances, and the laws of nature works conceptually similarly
in Patent. Needless to say, while these doctrines serve to avoid anticommons property situations, at the margins
ofall of these areas, there is substantial doctrinal confusion about where to draw the line between protection and
unprotectability. See generally.J. H. Reichman, LegalHybrids Between the PatentandCopyrightParadigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
68. DAvID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE
CAPITALISM 93-94 (1997):
By the beginning of World War I, a number of companies had arrived at a stalemate
with regard to radio development, due to mutual patent interferences. During the war,
when the government guaranteed to protect the companies from infringement suits,
research in radio proceeded at a rapid pace. The close of the war, however, brought
with it a renewed deadlock. "Ownership of the various patents pertaining to vacuum
tubes and circuits by different concerns prevented the manufacture of an improved
tube for radio use." In addition to domestic competition, there was a very real
possibility that control over radio might be secured by the British Marconi Company,
which was trying at the time to obtain rights to the necessary GE-controlled
Alexanderson alternator.
In light of this threat to American supremacy of the airwaves, Woodrow Wilson and a
number of armed-forces representatives prevailed upon GE to withhold the necessary
patent rights and set up instead an American-owned company to control radio. In late
1919, GE thus established the Radio Corporation of America... and transferred its
assets, along with the Alexanderson and other GE-owned patents, to RCA. The
industry-wide impasse nevertheless remained, and "the only solution.., was to declare
a truce: get together and draw up an agreement defining the rights of the various
squatters on the frontiers of science." The truce was declared between AT&T [that
controlled the Lee DeForest-invented vacuum tube] and GE in the license agreement of
July 1, 1920, and within the following year ... the other companies in the patent
conflictjoined the radio-patent pool.... [T]he agreements kept all who were not party
to them out of the radio field.
69. See generally Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 38; see also Samuelson, supra note 38.
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computer programs 7° may have the unintended consequence of bringing about
a situation ofunderutilization and lower innovation and competition with regard
to those items. Looking to an even earlier time, consider how copyrights in
maps and navigational charts were seen as giving rise to either a monopoly on
descriptions of geographic and navigational features of coastlines or to an
underutilization of navigational charts. 7' Benjamin Kaplan has pointed out that
one reason legal documents (conceived of as legal "maps") have generally not
been thought of as possessing thick copyrights is that doing so might create
situations where too many people would be drafting around earlier legal
documents creating an unacceptable level of unpredictability. 72 In a sense, to
give strong legal protection to legal boilerplate would create an anticommons
situations where law firms would expend wasteful amounts of time exercising
and policing their "property rights" in legal language.
Similarly, under traditional understandings of trademark law, generic or
common descriptions of goods," mere geographic designations of origin74 and
surnames 75 were not considered susceptible to proprietorship without a showing
that they had acquired "secondary meaning" in the minds of relevant
consumers. 76 Until recently, trade dress, those aspects of a product that

70. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob & Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993); Sega
Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
71. Mason v. Montgomery Data Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding about the maps in question
that (1) the merger doctrine did not apply (idea and expression merge, and expression is unprotectable) and (2)
they possessed sufficient originality to qualify for copyright protection); see also U.S. v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d
448 (9th Cir. 1978); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990). But see David B. Wolf, Is There Any Copyright Protection
for Maps after Feist?, 39 J. COPYIUGHTSoc'Y 224 (1992); Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp.,
899 F.2d 1458, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that because the idea and its expression embodied in plaintiffs
maps are inseparable, "the maps at issue are not copyrightable"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 374 (1990).
72. BENiAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 64-65 (1967) (criticizing the Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley case in which the Second Circuit found copyright infringement liability for use of
an insurance claim form. Kaplan wrote, "the effect of the decision may be to force users to awkward and
possibly dangerous recasting of the legal language to avoid infringement actions.").
73. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2nd Cir. 1963); Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e) (2) (1997); American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173
Mass. 85 (Mass. 1899); In reNantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re House of Windsor, Inc., 221
U.S.P.Q. 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e) (4) (1997); In reApplication ofHarris-Intertype Corp., 518 F.2d 629 (C.C.P.A.
1975).
76. Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Application of
Synergistics Research Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q. 165 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
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involved its shape or packaging, was not considered protectable unless it was
nonfunctional or inherently distinctive. Until the Two Pesos case in 1992,17 it
was necessary to show a secondary meaning as well. After Two Pesos, no
showing of secondary meaning is required, thereby expanding the scope of trade
dress protection. These doctrines were all common-sense recognitions that
allowing property ownership (the right to exclude) to vest in things like ideas,78
facts,"9 mathematical formulas," laws of nature,"' and common descriptive
words or phrases would lead to underutilization of intellectual works
incorporating those preexisting, fundamental building blocks.82 Intuitively and
implicitly, the traditional intellectual property understandings of what was
considered to be in the public domain was seemingly an attempt to avoid a
"tragedy of the anticommons."
One key difference between Moscow storefronts and patents or copyrights
is that intellectual property rights do not involve a tangible boundary, but rather
a conceptual boundary-a boundary demarcated by the legal line between that
which is considered to be in the public domain (ideas; functional aspects of
useful goods and facts distinguished from original authorial expressions in
copyright; mathematical formulas; laws of nature distinguished from novel,
nonobvious, useful innovations in patent; and surnames and geographically
descriptive and common or generic terms distinguished from arbitrary, fanciful,
distinctive marks with secondary meaning in trademark law) and the private
domain. Another key difference between physical property and intellectual

77. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (stating that proof of secondary
meaning not required under a Lanham Act § 43(a) claim when trade dress is inherently distinctive). See 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (1996) (often referred toas a federal unfair competition law, because § 43(a) does not require
registration on the principal register).
78. 17 U.S.C.§ 102 (b) (1996) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); see also Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49
F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd (4-4), 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
79. Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also Bell South
Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11 th Cir. 1993);
Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright
Protectionin Works ofHistory After Hoehlingv. UniversalCity Studios, 29 J.COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 647 (1982).
80. CompareGottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
81. Compare Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), with Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
82. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 1981 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 147 (1981);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. 1. 965 (1990); Keith Aoki, Authors, Investors and
TrademarkOwners: PrivateIntellectualPropertyand the Public Domain, PartI and 11, 18 COLUM. J. L. &
ARTs. 1-73, 191-267 (1993-1994).
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property is that the supply of storefronts or grazing land is physically finite. As
Heller points out, if one continues drawing boundaries and parceling out
property rights, one eventually ends up with a spatial anticommons.
Elsewhere, I have discussed the "public goods" aspects of intellectual
property,8 3 but the main relevant point is that intellectual property seems
infinite, as though it were created ex nihilo, pulled from the empty ether by the
fevered imagination or intellect ofa transformative artistic or scientific genius.
As James Boyle has articulately pointed out, it is this vision of romantic
creativity that makes our common sense traditional intellectual property law and
doctrines expand consistently, if not always in the direction of greater
protection. 4 This expansion tends to make us ignore the common-sense
knowledge that new intellectual creations are formed from preexisting thoughts
and ideas in a long chain stretching back into antiquity. This particular and
peculiar vision of creativity makes it seem that expanding the scope and
increasing the types of intellectual property are without cost because the supply
of new ideas and works is apparently infinite. I say that this is apparent,
because as Heller points out, there is a point where too many property rights
owned by too many parties creates a legal "smog," that is, an anticommons.
When we reach this situation, a serious and consequentialist rethinking and
rebundling of property rights may be necessary so that we may connect the
purpose and intent of our intellectual property (or other) laws with their
effects-to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."85 Thus, the
nonphysicality of intellectual property may matter less here than the idea of the
scope of initial intellectual property entitlement as well as how the rights to
control are bundled.
Reichman argues that we are able to recognize these types of concerns, and
to tailor our legal system to address them. Observed in this light, the landmark
Feist case might be seen in part as an attempt to avoid a "tragedy of the
anticommons'-an attempt to make sure that the threshold for copyright

83. See generally Aoki, supra note 82, at 19-22; see also Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory ofPublic
Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
84. BOYLE, supra note 1. See also Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of
Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SoCIETY(1996)). See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L. J. 455 (1991); MARTHA WOODMANSEE,
THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994); MARK ROSE,
AutHORSANDOWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHTS (1993); PAULGOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994).

85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8.
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ownership was not set so low that all sorts of infringement claims would arise,
resulting in the underutilization of facts and data from public domain sources.
However, note that while the questions of commons or anticommons property
has not been generally addressed when considering expanding the scope of
patent rights, whether through the doctrine of equivalents' or through statutory
interpretation of subject matter categories (e.g., medical procedures or sports
moves"') within the United States, perhaps it should be.
There is another wrinkle in considering the expanding scope of domestic
intellectual property protection and the "public domain." In many ways, our
current conception of the public domain is that nobody affirmatively owns
public domain materials. It is this unowned characterization that is somewhat
at odds with a characterization of the public domain of intellectual materials as

86. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that in every patent infringement case, the court must apply the doctrine of equivalents); see also Peter K.
Schalestock, Equityfor Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-Literal Patent Infringement, 19 SEATTLE U.L
REV. 323 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in IntellectualProperty Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989 (1997). William W. Fisher l The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership
of Ideas in the United States 5-6 (Sept. 4, 1997)(on file with the INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUDIES).
87. Nineteenth century cases held that medical procedures were not patentable for policy grounds. See
Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.) (No. 9,865) (holding that a method
of performing surgery "combining therewith the application of ether" developed by two surgeons during the
Civil War was not patentable). Note that the PTO has changed its position and has indicated that medical
methods are patentable as processes if they meet the conditions of utility, nonobviousness and novelty. SeeEx
Parte Scherer, 103 U.S. P.Q. (BNA) 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (upholding a patent for a method of
injecting medicine via pressure jet); Edward Felsenthal, Medical Patents Trigger Debate Among Doctors,
WALL ST. J., August 11, 1994, at B 1; Joel J. Garris, The CaseforPatentingMedical Procedures,22 AM. J.L.
& MED. 85 (1996); Jeffrey Lewis, No ProtectionforMedical Processes: InternationalPostureMay Be Hurt
by New Law, NEw YORK LAW. J., March 10, 1997, at S1. See also U.S. Patent No. 4,960,129 (patenting
method for diagnosing heartbeat disorders); U.S. Patent No. 5,026,538 (patenting method for treating arthritis);
U.S. PatentNo. 5,320,094 (patenting method for administering insulin); Robert M. Kunstadt, et al., Are Sports
Moves Next in IP Law?, NATIONAL L.J., May 20, 1996, at C2:
Although the norms ofsports enthusiasts might be offended, sports is now big business,
and big business demands this protection. Entire industries exist to sell and promote
goods and services at sporting events and for use by sports participants. Players in this
vast market may benefit from the efficiency of fixed property rights in the fuel that
drives these market transactions. A key element of that fuel is the sports moves
themselves, and patents, copyrights and trademarks may provide the best tools for
securing those rights.
See also Fisher, supranote 86, at 4-5.
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a commons.88
For example, Carol Rose has raised a set of extremely cogent arguments
in response to Hardin's Tragedy ofthe Commons. Rose has described how in
certain situations the solution to depletion or overutilization of scarce resources
may not be to bestow private property rights, but to deploy common law and
statutory strategies that she has referred to as involving the Comedy of the
Commons. 9 The situations that Rose refers to involve what is thought of as
"public property." Rose points to the long Western legal pedigree of the idea
of "public property," orjuspublicum" Traditionally, due to their "inherent
publicness," certain types of property-land between high and low tides,
roadways, land underlying navigable waterways, and other such
properties-were conceived of as being subject to a public easement for fishing,
commercial and navigation purposes.91 During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,

88. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. Ctu. L. REV. 711, 721 (1996) [hereinafter Comedy of the Commons] ("[P]roperty in ... an
unorganized public would amount to an unlimited commons, which seems not to be property at all, but only a
mass of passive 'things' awaiting reduction to private property through the rule of capture or, worse yet, their
squandering in the usual 'tragedy of the commons."'). See also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on
Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996)
[hereinafter A Dozen Propositions].
89. Comedy ofthe Commons, supra note 88.
90. Id. at 713. See also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 517 (1990) ("The ideatexpression dichotomy's roots in res communes and ferae
naturae provide the most obvious was in which the natural law creates a public domain .... [T]hese concepts
prohibited property claims in those objects which were by nature difficult to possess. . . [and imply] that
copyright should not be extended to those facets of a work which are difficult to possess."); Daniel R.
Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the
Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979); Harry N. Schneiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in
American LegalHistory, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217 (1984); Molly Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in American
Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1403.
91. Comedy of the Commons, supra note 88, at 713-14. See also Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (C.C.S.D. Il1.1892) (Field, J.):
That the State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan,
within its limits, in the same manner that the State holds title to soils under tide water,
by the common law, we have already shown.... But it is a title different in character
from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.... It is a title held in trust
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.
Id. at 452. For an updated application of the Public Trust Doctrine applied to lakefront property owned by
Loyola University in Chicago, see Lake Michigan Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'r, 742 F. Supp.
441,445-447 (N.D. Ill. 1990):
Three basic principles can be distilled from this body of public trust case law. First,
courts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender valuable public resources
to a private entity.... Second, the public trust is violated when the primary purpose of
a legislative grant is to benefit a private interest.... Finally, any attempt by the state to
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state courts began using these older precedents, some dating back to the midnineteenth century, to carve out a growing set of "public rights" that served to
limit what private property owners could do with their property.' In particular,
the public easement for fishing, commerce and navigation has been expanded
to include recreational uses, and in some cases has been extended to include dry
sand areas of beaches.93 Rose observes:
Like the older precedents, the new beach cases usually employ
one of three theoretical bases: (1) a "public trust" theory, to
the effect that the public has always had rights of access to the

relinquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated under the doctrine....
What we have here is atransparent giveaway of public property to a private entity. The
lakebed of Lake Michigan is held in trust for and belongs to the citizenry of the state.
The conveyance of lakebed property to a private party-no matter how reputable and
highly motivated that private party may be-violates this public trust doctrine.
92. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (extending the Public Trust Doctrine to encompass
preservation of tidelands in their natural state in the face of the tideland owner's desire to fill them in, and
recognizing that Public Trust may protect other interests such as wildlife habitat, water quality, recreation, and
aesthetics). See also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(California Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge to a permit granted by the California Water Board to
the City of Los Angeles to draw down five tributaries feeding Mono Lake (because of drawdowns, Mono lake
had shrunk to a third of its former size)--the Court held that the State of California lacked the authority to grant
absolute water rights that would cause substantial ecological damage); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d
761 (Wis. 1972) (extending Public Trust Doctrine to wetlands and preventing private owner from infilling);
Joseph L. Sax, The Limits ofPrivateRights in Public Waters, 19 ENvrL. L. 473 (1989); Richard J. Lazarus,
ChangingConceptions of PropertyandSovereignty in NaturalResources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine,71 IOWA L. REv. 631 (1986); Joseph L. Sax, The PublicTrust Doctrinein NaturalResource Law:
Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). But cf James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of
Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); James L.
Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth ofPublicRights: The Public Trust and Reserved
Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987).
93. Comedy ofthe Commons, supra note 88, at 713-14. For cases expanding public access to waterfront
properties, see, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332
(1994) (Scalia, J.and O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (using Public Trust Doctrine); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (holding that 19t century "inherently public" tidelands did
not convey title free of the public trust, however, lands filled in the past, now free of trust); Van Ness v.
Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla.
1974) (using prescription theory); Gion v. Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970) (using theory of "implied
dedication," but subsequently legislatively overruled); Borough ofNeptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-TheSea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972) (using Public Trust Doctrine); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or.
1969) (using idea of custom to support access). But cf McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989)
(applying custom only to beaches where actual public use could be demonstrated); Opinion ofthe Justices, 313
N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (rejecting New Jersey Public Trust Doctrine approach); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557
A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (limiting Public Trust Easement in tidelands strictly to those uses reserved in colonial
ordinances from 1641: fishing, fowling and navigation).

1998]

NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY

property in question, and that any private rights are
subordinate to the public's "trust" rights; (2) a prescriptive or
dedicatory theory, by which a period of public usage gives rise
to an implied grant or gift from private owners; and (3) a
theory of "custom," where the public asserts ownership of
property under some claim so ancient that it antedates any
memory to the contrary.9
Rose goes on to observe that these cases seemingly contradict traditional
economic analysis by inverting the logic of viewing private property as the
optimal solution to the tragedy of the commons. At first blush, these cases take
private property and turn it into a commons, in which anyone and everyone can
overuse and despoil such properties-the right to exclude has been taken from
the owner's bundle of sticks. This raises the question whether, "[A]ny property
inherently or even presumptively [should be] withdrawn from exclusive private
expropriation?" 95
To answer this question, Rose points to two traditional exceptions to the
general preference favoring private property ownership: (1) 'plenteous' goods.
...[T]hings that are either so plentiful or so unbounded that it is not worth the
effort to create a system of resource management... [f]or which the difficulty
of privatization outweighs the gains in careful resource management," ' and,
(interestingly for intellectual property purposes); (2) public goods "where many
persons desire access to or control over a given property, but they are too
numerous and their individual stakes too small to express their preferences in
' Interestingly, note that intellectual property possesses
market transactions."97
two characteristics ofa "public good:" jointness of supply and impossibility of
exclusion.
While the analogy between real property and intellectual property is
incomplete and discontinuous in many ways, some of the logic of the "public
trust" and "custom" cases, such as National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court ofAlpine County (the "Mono Lake" case)9" in 1983 and Stevens v. City

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Comedy of the Commons, supra note 88, at 714.
Id.at 717.
Id.
Id.at 719.
National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 709 (1983).
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of Cannon Beach in 1993," may be helpful in framing questions of the
intellectual public domain. In the Mono Lake case, the California Supreme
Court stated that the State of California lacked the authority to grant the City
of Los Angeles absolute water rights which had significant ecological impact
(drawing down the water level in Mono Lake by diverting five feeder streams
to Los Angeles and shrinking Mono Lake by over a third in size) on areas that
were subject to the public trust."° In the Stevens case, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the denial of a building permit to build a seawall on the dry sand
area of a beach was not a taking under the Just Compensation Clause, and that
maintenance of public access to the dry sand beach had arisen pursuant to the
doctrine of custom.' The Stevens case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari over a strong dissent from Justices Scalia and
O'Connor. 2 What significance might a salt lake in California and a stretch of
dry sand beach in Oregon hold for intellectual property law?
First, the logic of both opinions suggests that certain types of land
possessing unique characteristics are subject to the public trust. A baseline
presumption in U.S. property law is that all property rights within the United
States originate from the United States or some predecessor sovereign. When
the federal sovereign passed these property rights either to the state sovereigns
or to private individuals, it retained or reserved the stick in the property rights

99. Stevens, 854 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (1994) (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
100. National Audubon Soc'y; 658 P.2d at 724.
[Tihe public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for
public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right
of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.
101. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456-57.
When plaintiffs took title to their land, they were on notice that exclusive use of the dry
sand areas was not a part of the "bundle ofrights" that they acquired, because public use
of dry sand areas "is so notorious that notice of the custom on the part of persons buying
land along the shore must be presumed.". . .We, therefore, hold that the doctrine of
custom as applied to public use of Oregon's dry sand areas is one of "the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property... already place upon land
ownership." ... We hold that plaintiffs have never had the property interests that they
claim were taken by defendants' decision and regulations.
102. Stevens, 854 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (1994) (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.):
To say that this case raises a serious Fifth Amendment takings issue is an
understatement. The issue is serious in the sense that it involves a holding of
questionable constitutionality; and it is serious in the sense that the land-grab (if there
is one) may run the entire length of the Oregon coast.
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bundle pertaining to use and maintenance of those properties, consistent with
the public trust. To the extent that private property owners use their property
contrary to the public trust, state government may move in to regulate or
prohibit those uses in the name of exercising its reserved public trust
responsibilities, thereby acting as trustee for members of the public.
Additionally, when acting pursuant to the public trust, no "taking" occurs
because the "right" to use private property contrary to the public trust was
never a part of the bundle of sticks that we call property ownership in the first
place, but was reserved by the sovereign. Similarly, in the Stevens case,
expectations that had arisen over the course of a long period of time about
public beach access were recognized, and thejudicial (or legislative) recognition
ofthese customary rights effected no "taking" either because the property owner
took title subject to, and with notice of,the "custom" of beach access in Oregon.
The relevance for intellectual property law is that instead of geographic
features of land (beaches, lakes, and wetlands), there may be categories of
information that could be conceived of as possessing characteristics of public
trust property. One problem with our intellectual property law, and copyright
law in particular, is that it, on a general level, treats all copyrightable subject
matter the same. For example, a song by Kurt Cobain is different from a
scientific treatise, DOOM is different from a first grade textbook about the
alphabet, an X-Men comic book is different than Lotus 1-2-3. Perhaps there
are some categories of uses that might be worth granting an "easement"-like
right in members of the public (or for that matter, publishers in the Third
World).
The structure of the argument would proceed through several steps. First,
because the U.S. Constitution mandates "securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries"
in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," there is a link
between the positivist property rights granted and a constitutionally mandated
public purpose. Second, one might argue that this grant is from the sovereign
to "authors and inventors" only to the extent that promotion of that public
purpose (advancing science and the useful arts) is achieved. Furthermore, such
a conditioned grant presupposes a reservation of power in the sovereign when
the actual effects of such a grant work against those public purposes. A
shadow ofthis reasoning can be seen in copyright and patent misuse cases. The
grant of exclusive rights to authors and inventors never included the right to use
that grant for anticompetitive purposes that are contrary to antitrust laws-it
was never a stick in the bundle of rights that comes with a patent or a
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copyright. 3 Another shadowy example is copyright law's fair use doctrine and
patent law's reverse doctrine of equivalent exceptions-one might conceive of
"fair use" or "reverse doctrine ofequivalents" as a species of "easement" in the
name of the public."°
Third, this line of reasoning embodies some broad-based public trust-type

103. In the patent misuse area, see Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (refusing use of licenses
beyond term of patent); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (tying unpatented
products to patented products to capture the market for both); U.S. Dept. of Justice Guidelines for the Licensing
and Acquisition of Intellectual Property § 5.6 (Aug. 8, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(prohibiting certain types of "grant back" clauses that require a patent licensee to "grant back" to the licensor
any improvement patents). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Note, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599 (1990).
In the area of copyright, misuse is relatively recent. In particular, since 1990, there have been a number
of cases finding a plaintiff's copyright unenforceable because of misuse. See DSC Communications Corp. v.
DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5"' Cir. 1996) (finding copyright misuse appropriate where copyright
owner tried expanding the copyright beyond its scope into a patent-like monopoly); Bateman v. Mnemonics,
h
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1547 (1 1 Cir. 1996) (suggesting that copyright misuse was relevant to prevent an owner
ofa copyright from gaining protection for an idea in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Lasercomb America, Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4" Cir. 1990) (describing copyright misuse as "an equitable defense to an
infringement action ... [when] the copyright is being used in a matter violative of... the public policy
embodied in the grant of a copyright."); Qad Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ii. 1991);
Timothy H. Fine, Misuse andAntitrustDefenses to Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 315
(1965); Marshall Leaffer, EngineeringCompetitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv.
1087 (1994); James A. D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That Is the Software Copyright Question, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 251 (1997); Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Searchfor Functional
Copyright Misuse Standards,46 STAN. L. REv. 401 (1994).
These additional issues arise in terms of contract and license terms that conflict with a user's legitimate
interests under the copyright statute. There are many open questions about the validity of software contracts
that purport to prohibit reverse engineering and decompilation of licensed software. There have been a series
ofcases that have allowed some degree of reverse engineering in certain circumstances. See Lotus Dev. Corp.
v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1' Cir. 1995); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-8
(9 h Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 975 F.2d 832, 843-4 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5' Cir. 1988). See also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out"
Programs,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995); Samuelson, supra note 70. Contracts and licenses may also ask
licensees to waive other rights provided by the copyright statute, such as the § 117 right to copy and adapt a
program to work on a particular machine. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). Or licenses may forbid licensees from
transferring copies of the copyrighted work in ways that conflict with the "first sale" doctrine of§ 109(a). See
17 U.S.C. § 109(a)-(bX 1)A) (1994). There are also nonwaivable rights granted by the copyright statute, such
as the right of authors of older works to terminate transfers of rights in a copyrighted work between 35 and 40
years after the work was created. See generally Mark A. Lemley, BeyondPreemption: The FederalLaw and
Policy of IntellectualPropertyLicensing, Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming January 1999).
104. Some other examples of areas where lower (or nonexistent) levels of per se intellectual property
protection have actually helped spur competitiveness and innovation are: clothing designs (which are
noncopyrightable, although trade dress protection may apply for confusingly similar garments); utilitarian
aspects of useful goods; architectural designs prior to 1992 (when architectural works became copyrightable);
university-sponsored scientific research prior to 1984 (when the federal government directed that such research
be patented); and legal documents (which while copyrightable, are seldom asserted) and judicial opinions.
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of responsibility reserved to the federal government to keep certain information
(for example, some types of basic scientific research, information in databases,
educational purposes and uses, new medical techniques, or even human genomic
material)' 5 available and open to benefit both the public and private owners.
Lastly, an important point is that this line of reasoning conceptualizes
information in the public domain not as "unowned," but as owned by everyone.
Part of the tragedy of the commons was that no one asserted the public right to
maintain the commons-the default position seemed to be a powerless local
government. As Rose has shown, public and private property rights work in
tandem to maintain a vibrant free-enterprise system."°e Duncan Kennedy and
Frank Michelman have argued that:
[While] much legal and related policy-analytic literature
reflects and reinforces the view that certain legal institutions
(e.g., private property, free contract) are in some sense
generallyorpresumptivelyefficient, while others (e.g., central
regulatory command, commonses) are generally or
presumptively inefficient.... [A]ny actually efficient regime,
though it may well contain rules fairly characterizable as
private property and free contract, must contain them in
combination with rules drawn from realms perceived as
opposite to private property/free contract (viz., unowned
commonses and collective controls) so that there is no more
reason for awarding the palm of "presumptive efficiency" to
private property/free contract than to its opposites. 07

105. The copyright statute already has a plethora of odd, seemingly unconnected exemptions. See 17
U.S.C. § 110 (6) (1994) (exempting from copyright infringement liability a "performance of a nondramatic
musical work by a governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural ... fair or exhibition
conducted by such body or organization..."); 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994) (exempting a"performance or display
of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational
institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction...
106. A Dozen Propositions, supra note 88, at 267.
[H]istoric Anglo-American legal principles did indeed recognize the importance of
private property rights, which are essential in a functioning free enterprise economy. But
those principles also recognized what were called "public rights," particularly in
resources that are not easily turned into private property-historically, air, water
resources, and fish and wildlife stocks--because the management of such diffuse
resources is also essential in a functioning economic order of free enterprise.
107. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 16, at 714.
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Perhaps, some types of information may be so conceptually similar to
things like land underlying navigable waterways, beaches and coastal areas, and
the electromagnetic spectrum, that too many private property rights give rise
to "common pool" problems that are only addressable through some type of
regulatory regime that ensures continued access for the public. Note that in this
formulation, the anticommons problem does not arise because "everyone" does
not possess the "right to exclude" as was the case with Moscow storefronts, but
the "public" (via the government) may be able to prevent private parties from
making maximalist property claims that harm the promotion of science and
useful arts. Additionally, rather than conceptualizing the intellectual public
domain as unowned (a sort of default zone where things that are so rudimentary
or useless come to lie), we may be able to conceptualize it as an intellectual
zone where things that are too important to be owned by one party reside. They
are, in effect, owned by the public.
There are three major criticisms of this approach. First, it is unclear (even
in the real property area) whether the federal government is subject to the public
trust doctrine. To date, it has been largely a creature of state common law and
has been quite controversial over the past three decades0'3 Indeed, I am not
even arguing that public trust doctrine be applied to intellectual property, only
that it may provide a different perspective on conceptualizing intellectual
property rights. Second, there are large definitional problems in terms of
delineating categories of creations that might be subject (educational, scientific,
and so on)-how narrowly or broadly should possible categories be defined to
this "intellectual public trust," particularly given the paradigmatic institutional
capture by the agropharmaceutical and copyright industries of the U.S.
Copyright and Patent and Trademark Office in the 1990s. Finally, questions
of standing to sue would be very problematic in terms of who would be
empowered to assert the "public trust." There are an increasing number of
organizations that are possible candidates, such as the Taxpayer Assets Project
(headed by James Love), the Electronic Frontier Foundation or the Digital
Future Coalition that opposed the adoption in 1996 of the WIPO Database
Protection Proposal.
I do not offer these observations to introduce a ready-for-implementation

108. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("In this
country the public trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.... [N]either the
Supreme Court nor the federal courts of appeals have expressly decided whether public trust duties apply to the
United States."); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L REv. 269 (1980).
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legislative orjudicial proposal-far from it. I believe that some of the ultimate
goals that underlie the public trust doctrine in the environmental law area may
have some deep connections with how we are administering and constructing
our information environment-in particular, how we talk about "property,"
intellectual or otherwise. A privatized information environment that is unable
to contemplate any other standard for measuring its worth other than market
efficiency may be, on many levels, a dystopian environment indeed.
James Boyle has recently written of the analogies between the nascent state
of environmental law in the early 1960s, when public consciousness of the
dangers of environmental degradation began dawning, and the current state of
public consciousness of intellectual property laws."° Boyle has called for an
"environmentalism for the Net" in terms of the need for activism in the name of
protecting and maintaining a healthy balance ofpublic and private rights in the
digital environment. Boyle points out:
In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the
very structure of the decision-making process tends to produce
a socially undesirable outcome. Decisions in a democracy are
made badly when they are primarily made by and for the
benefit of a few stakeholders, be they landowners or content
providers. It is a matter of rudimentary political science
analysis or public choice theory to say that democracy fails
when the gains of a particular action can be captured by a
relatively small and well-identified group while the
losses--even if larger in the aggregate-are low-level effects
spread over a larger, more inchoate group. This effect is only
intensified when the transaction costs of identifying and
resisting the change are high."
As part of this "environmentalism" to protect the "intellectual"
environment, we must first define exactly what we are protecting, which is
where the works of Reichman, Rose, and Boyle are very helpful. If we fail to
begin this project now, in fifty years we may find ourselves looking back as we
consider how the true "tragedy of the commons" was the massive privatization

109. Boyle, supra note 5, at 87.
110. Id. at 110.
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of the intellectual public domain in the late twentieth century."'
Ill. THE LEGITIMACY OF CULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS

Connected to questions about our legal construction of the intellectual
public domain are additional and troubling questions of cross-cultural
appropriations that occur with greater frequency in the not-so-brave new world
economic order of TRIPS and globalization. We need to be careful about
constructing the public domain to avoid conceiving of the biological and
cultural resources of the Third World as belonging to the "common heritage of
humanity," thereby effectively putting them up for grabs by entrepreneurs from
the developed countries eager to turn such public domain items into private
intellectual property. There is a paradoxical need to simultaneously rein in the
maximalist impulse in the intellectual laws of the developed countries and to
imagine ways to protect the cultural and biological resources of the developing
and least developed countries. In particular, there is a very serious question
whether the category "property," or the historically contingent and
individualistic notion of "property" that has arisen in the West, is even
appropriate when discussing things like agricultural practices, cell lines, seed
plasm, and oral narratives that "belong" to communities rather than
individuals." 2 Ifwe are not capable ofacknowledgingthe existence of different
life-worlds and ways of envisioning human beings' relationship to the natural
world in our intellectual property laws, then unfortunately, it may be late in the
day for biodiversity and hopes for a genuinely multicultural world." 3

111. See James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 31, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7499914.
112. See Gana, The Myth ofDevelopment, supra note 21; See also Has Creativity Died in the Third
World?, supra note 21.
113. For an example of this tendency to conceive of the cultures, indeed, the very bodies of indigenous
peoples as "treasure," see Lisa Belkin, Chasing Bad Genes to the Ends of the Earth: The High-Tech Future
of Medicine It Encrypted in the Blood of Remote Peoples. For the New, Intrepid Gene Hunters, There Is
Treasure Buried in Those Veins, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 26, 1998, at 46,52 (describing medical expeditions
from U.S. Universities to gather genetic materials and blood from peoples in Saudi Arabia (searching for
glaucoma gene), Nigeria, Ghana (searching for diabetes gene), Mongolia (searching for deafness gene)), Tristan
da Cunha (searching for asthma gene) and the island of Cebu in the Phillipines (searching for cleft palate and
lip gene):
There is money to be made in genetic research, because pharmaceutical companies are
eager to buy the patent rights for cloned genes that could be used to create new families
of drugs. For example, the gene that regulates the production of leptin, which in turn

regulates the metabolism offat, was purchased by the pharmaceutical company Amgen
from Rockefeller University for $20 million. The search for the asthma gene of Tristan
de Cunha is being financed by Axys Pharmaceuticals.

1998]

NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY

Vandana Shiva," 4 Ruth L. Gana (Okedij i),' s Rosemary Coombe," 6 James
Boyle,"' Jack Kloppenberg," 8 and others"9 have been writing and working to
theorize and publicize what has been called the "Great Seed Ripoff"-international conventions granting "plant breeder's rights allowing
commercial plant breeders to use traditional indigenous varieties of seeds, and
'improve' them via minor genetic alterations and then receive patents in the
varieties, eventually selling them back to the communities that produced them
initially."' 20 However, their concerns go much further than merely protesting the
granting of U.S. patents in seed plasm and biologically-engineered genetic
material. Vandana Shiva writes:
The freedom that transnational corporations are claiming
through intellectual property rights protection in the GATT
agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights is the
freedom that European colonizers have claimed since 1492.
Columbus set a precedent when he treated the license to
conquer non-European peoples as a natural right of European
men. The land titles issued by the pope through European
Eurocentric
kings and queens were the first patents ....
notions of property and piracy are the bases on which the IPR

Id. at 52. See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919 (1996).
114. BIOPIRACY, supra note 21.
115. Gana, The Myth of Development, supranote 21.
116. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, CULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS: AUTHORSHIP, ALTERITY AND THE LAW
(forthcoming 1998).
117. BOYLE, supra note 1.
118. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 21, at 1492-2000 (1988); JACK R. KLOPPENBERG, JR., SEEDS AND
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES (1988).
119. See, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century: Human Life as Intellectual Property,NATION,
Apr. 13, 1998 at 11; Andrew Kimbrell, Biocolonization: The Patentingof Life and the GlobalMarket in
Body Parts, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 6; ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN
BODY SHOP: THE ENGINEERING AND MARKETING OF LIFE (1993); Susan Wright, Down on the Animal Pharm:

Splicing Away Regulations, NATION, Mar. 11, 1996; Darrell A. Posey, InternationalAgreements and
Intellectual Property Right Protectionfor Indigenous Peoples, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21.
120. See the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 that extends patent-like protection to novel varieties
of sexually reproduced plants. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2582 (1988), amended by the Plant Variety Protection Acts
Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108 Stat. 3136. See also 17 U.S.C. § 161 (1984) (providing for
patents in asexually reproduced plants); Craig Edgar, Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof, 34
WASHBURN L.J. 76 (1994); Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants,Poverty,andPharmaceuticalPatents, 103 YALE
L.J. 223 (1993); Erin B. Newman, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabinet: Rain ForestDestruction andits
Impact on the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 479 (1994).
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laws of the GATT and [WTO] have been framed. When
Europeans first colonized the non-European world, they felt it
was their duty to "discover and conquer," to "subdue, occupy,
and possess," ... [elverything, every society, every culture.
The colonies have now been extended to the interior spaces,
the "genetic codes" of life-forms from microbes and plants to
animals, including humans.... The assumption of empty
lands, terra nullius, is now being expanded to 'empty life,'
seeds and medicinal plants ...[and this] same logic is being
used to appropriate biodiversity from the original owners and
innovators by defining their seeds, medicinal plants, and
medical knowledge as nature, as nonscience, and treating tools
of genetic engineering as the yardstick of "improvement."...
At the heart of the GATT treaty and its patent laws is the
treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of Western
corporations, necessary for the "development" of Third World
communities. 121
The question of the direction of the flow of valuable resources, whether
genetic or indigenous agricultural or medical knowledge, is extremely relevant
to constructing the intellectual public domain as well. As Vandana Shiva points
out, representing the cultural property of non-European peoples as "natural" or
"primitive" equates such properties as "unowned" and up for grabs by erstwhile
and entrepreneurial "civilized" proprietors. Any formulation ofthe intellectual
public domain must take account of the culture-bound nature of our concepts
of property and how:
The model on which protection of creative labor currently
[advocated by TRIPS] is premised on a unique combination of
convictions about what constitutes property, the role of
property, and the use of property rights to allocate resources
.. . [and] reflect[s] values of liberty, individualism, and
autonomy, which are central to the society of western

121. BIoPIRAcY, supra note 21, at 2-5. See also Mark Ritchie, et al., IntellectualPropertyRights and
Biodiversity: The Industrialization of NaturalResources and TraditionalKnowledge, II ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 431 (1996); Ajay K. Sharma, The Global Loss of Biodiversity: A Perspective in the
Context of the Controversy Over IntellectualProperty Rights, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (1995).
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liberalism .... [This ignores the interests of] developing
countries all over the world ...[in] retain[ing] those values
that are core to their identities and that ultimately determine
how development occurs.... Simply enacting [western-style]
intellectual property laws in a cultural, economic and political
vacuum is shortsighted and futile. . . .Trivial[izing] the
contributions of pre-industrial peoples to the wealth of the
world's resources in inventions, literature, music, and the arts,
despite the fact that some of this contribution continues to
supply the industrialized world with answers to modem
plagues.'
The sad irony is that the intellectual property-rich nations ofthe developed
world have pushed for swift enactment of TRIPS in order to avoid what they
claim are disastrous and ruinous levels ofpiracy oftheir intellectual properties,
whether computer programs, videos, music CDs, movies, or technology, by
countries of the developing and least developed nations. However, the
ideological content of these piracy claims becomes evident when considering
that the fears seem to mask the amount of piracy occurring in the opposite
direction-invaluable biological and cultural resources flowing out of the
countries of the South as "raw materials" into the developed nations of the
North where they are magically transformed in the laboratories of
pharmaceutical and agricultural corporations into protected intellectual
properties whose value is underwritten by provisions ofmultilateral agreements
such as TRIPS. Vandana Shiva writes:
The United States has accused the Third World of piracy. The
estimates for royalties lost are $202 million per year for
agricultural chemicals and $2.5 billion annually for
pharmaceuticals. In a 1986 U.S. Department of Commerce
survey, U.S. Companies claimed they lost $23.8 billion yearly

122. Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21, at 339, 341. See also Michael J. Huft,
Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L
REV. 1678 (1995); Kirstin Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries, 33 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 277 (1992); Vandana Date, Comment, Global "Development" and its Environmental
Ranufications-The Interlinking of Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights,
27 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 631 (1997); Curtis M. Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity
Under Intellectual Property Law: Toward a New International System, 10 J. ENVTL L & L1TIG. 1 (1995).
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due to inadequate or ineffective protection of intellectual
property.... [However] if the contributions of Third World
peasants and tribespeople are taken into account, the roles are
dramatically reversed: the United States would owe Third
World countries $302 million in agriculture royalties and $5.1
billion for pharmaceuticals.2 2
For example, it raises the issue of what role national sovereignty may play
in establishing local regimes not only of intellectual property protection, but
also local regimes that dictate that certain subject matter will not be susceptible
to privatization and appropriation. It may be that despite many rumors of its
impending demise in the era of globalization, news ofthe demise of the nationstate may be premature. Ironically, the increasing transnational proprietors of
vast (and private) intellectual property holdings must turn to the national legal
regimes in order to underwrite the value of their holdings. Additionally, there
is a paradox, because as "free trade" ideally envisages a single global market,
traditionally both publishers asserting copyrights and corporations asserting
patents have depended on their ability to restrict territorially rights in separate
national markets-markets that are underwritten and demarcated by national
sovereignty. Thus, it is far from clear that a global intellectual property will be
able to be completely free from the centripetal pull of national or local
intellectual property regimes.
For example, the Indian Government is currently considering legislation
creating a National Bioresource Authority (NBA) to protect India's
bioresources and would:
[Prohibit non-Indians] from "obtaining any biological
resources for research or commercial utilization or collecting

123. BIOPiRACY, supra note 21, at 56. See generally Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing
PropertyRights in Traditional BioculturalContribution, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J 74 (1997); Lester L.Yano,
Protectionof the EthnobiologicalKnowledge of Indigenous Peoples, 41 UCLA L REV. 443 (1993); ileana
Dominguez-Urban, Harmonizationin the Regulation of PharmaceuticalResearch andHuman Rights: The
Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245 (1997); John R. Adair, Comment, The Bioprospecting
Question: Shouldthe UnitedStates ChargeBiotechnologyCompaniesforthe CommercialUse of PublicWild
Genetic Resources?, 24 ECOLOGY LQ. 131 (1997); Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The
PharmaceuticalIndustry Drive to Harmonize GlobalIntellectual PropertyRules, and the Remaining WTO
Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L, 1069 (1996); Edgar J.
Asebey and Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity
Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 703 (1995).
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samples or undertaking any activity in the nature of
bioprospecting without previous approval of the NBA" [and
makes it illegal for an Indian citizen to transfer] "the results of
any research with respect to any biological resource for
monetary consideration to any person who is not a citizen of
India without NBA approval." Violators will face a five-year
jail term and a fine of US $30,000.24
This type of legislation has been inspired in large part by the activities of
companies such as W.R. Grace, the Native Plant Institute, and the Japanese
Terumo Corporation that together have patented a number of products derived
from the neem tree. The neem tree is a versatile Indian plant, an evergreen that
grows up to fifty feet in height. The neem tree's bark, flowers, seeds, and fruit
have been used medicinally since ancient times to treat a wide variety of
ailments. Additionally, branches of the neem tree have been used as an
antiseptic toothbrush, and its oil has been used in toothpaste and soap.
Importantly, residue of neem seeds, after oil has been extracted, has been used
for generations as a potent insecticide against locusts, nematodes, mosquito
larvae, boll weevils, and beetles. 2 In 1971, Robert Larson, a U.S. national
who was aware of the multiple uses of the neem tree in India, imported neem
seeds to the United States and began experimenting with them, ultimately
producing and patenting a pesticide named Margosan-O made from neem
extract. Since the mid- 1980s, Grace and other firms have received over a dozen
patents on neem-based solutions and emulsions; Larson sold his patent to W.R.
Grace in 1988. W.R. Grace has set up a plant and network to process twenty
tons of neem seed per day. Neem seed prices have gone up from 300 rupeesper

124. K.S. Jayaraman, India Drafts Law to ProtectBioresources,NATURE, Nov. 13, 1997, at 108.

A key provision of the legislation is that no one will be able to apply for a patent based
on research or information gathered from any Indian biological resource without
informing the NBA. Before giving permission for patenting, the authority will impose
a benefit-sharing fee or royalty which will be credited to a biological diversity fund to
be used to develop the communities which helped to conserve the biological resources.
See also Sarah Laird, Natural Products and the Commercialization of Traditional Knowledge, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21; Stephen B.
Brush, A Non-MarketApproachto ProtectingBiological Resources, in INTELi.EcrUALPROPERTY RIGHTS AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK 131, supra note 21; Compare R. King, Establishing Reciprocity:
Biodiversity, Conservation and New Models for CooperationBetween Forest-Dwelling Peoples and the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK
69, supra note 21.
125. Vandana Shiva & Radha Holla-Bhar, Piracyby Patent: The Caseof the Neem Tree, in THE CASE
AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 146.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:11

ton to 3000 to 4000 rupees per ton, turning:
[A]n often free resource into an exorbitantly priced one, with
the local user now competing for seed with an industry that is
supplying wealthy consumers in the North. As the local
farmer cannot afford the price that industry can, the diversion
of the seed as raw material from the community to industry
will ultimately establish a regime in which a handful of
companies holding patents will control all access and all
production related to neem as raw material. 26
Another example of this biocolonialism where resources and discoveries
flow out of the Third World as "raw materials," only to return from the
laboratories of the West as intellectual properties owned by foreign
corporations, is the case of the African Soapberry. The African Soapberry has
been used traditionally for centuries as insecticide and fish intoxicant. In 1964
an Ethiopian researcher, Dr. Akilu Lemma, reported to the English Tropical
Products Institute that the African Soapberry of Endod was toxic to watersnails that carried the disease dilharzia. Subsequently, the Tropical Plant
Institute patented an extraction process to produce a commercial molluscicide
to kill zebra mussels that clog North American waterways. Dr. Lemma was
neither credited for the discovery nor receives any royalties.'27
Even human beings are not exempt from this process. National sovereignty
cuts both ways. While India or the countries of the European Union may not
want to go down the path of biopatents, the United States has forged ahead full
speed. Since the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case, Diamond v.
"' that upheld Dr. Ananda K. Chakrabarty's (a General Electric
Chakrabarty,28
microbiologist) patent claim in a genetically engineered oil-eating bacteria, the
holding thereby overturned the traditional legal rule that "products of nature"
such as life-forms were not patentable subject matter. In 1985, the U.S. Patent
and Trade Office (PTO) granted a patent to Dr. Kenneth Hibberd on the

126. Id.at 153; See also Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, ForeignPrior
Art and the Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997).
127. Shiva & Holla-Bhar, supra note 125, at 155. See also the patent granted to RiceTec for
genetically engineered Basmati Rice (U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (Sept. 2, 1997)) that was protested by over
50,000 people at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India, in May 1998; See generally Statement from
Peoples' Movements & NGOs in Southeast Asia to the World Trade Organization, No Patents on Rice! No
Patents on Life! (May 15, 1998) (on file with the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies).
128. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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culture, seed, and plant of an entire line of corn. 29 In 1987, the PTO granted
a patent to Philip Leder and Timothy Stewart on a genetically engineered
mouse. 3 If carried to its logical extreme, the question arises that if a
genetically engineered mouse could be patented, why not a genetically
engineered person (or part of a person)?
For years epidemiologists have noted that a virus associated with hairy-cell
leukemia was prevalent among the Guayami tribe in Panama. In the early
1990s, U.S. researchers took blood samples from members ofthe Guayami tribe
to analyze. In particular, the blood of a twenty-six year old mother of two who
had contracted hairy-cell leukemia interested the researchers. In December
1991, acting on the behest of the U.S. Commerce Department, the researchers
applied for a patent on a cultivated cell line from the Guayami woman's blood.
The patent application listed Dr. Jonathan Kaplan of the Centers for Disease
Control in Atlanta as the "inventor" of the cell line.'
Opposition to the global politics of intellectual property is emerging. For
example, in March 1995, the European Parliament voted to ban the patenting
of life-forms. When news of the patent application for the Guayami woman's
cell line reached the press, religious leaders and indigenous communities were
outraged, and the Commerce Department eventually abandoned its patent
application in November 1993. In October 1993, on Gandhi's birthday,
500,000 Indian farmers staged a mass protest in Bangladore at the Indian
offices of Cargill Seeds Private Ltd., a subsidiary of the largest privately held
corporation in the United States. The farmers objected to the patenting of the
neem seed which had been used in their farming communities for centuries-as
well as the agricultural and intellectual property provisions of the then imminent
32
GATT.'
129. See Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).
130. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 .(April 12, 1988); Keith Schneider, HarvardGets Mouse Patent,
A WorldFirst,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1988, at Al.
131. Kimbrell, Biocolonization, supra note 119, at 142-43. On the possibility of someone (or a
corporation) becoming the Bill Gates or Microsoft of the Human Genome, see Nicholas Wade, Scientist's Plan:
Map All DNA Within 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at Al:
Perkins-Elmer intends to be sparring in laying claim to intellectual property rights over
the genome, believing the company will create more demand for its [gene-sequencing]
machines if it allows its sequences to be widely accessible .... Whether the new
company could gain a significant lock on the human genomes... is not at all clear.
Human Genome Sciences [another biotech company], for example, has already obtained
the full-length sequence of 80 percent of human genes... and has presumably filed
patent applications.
132. Philip L. Bereano, Patent Nonsense - Patent Pending: The Race to Own DNA, SEATrLE TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1995, at B5.
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These trends also hold ominous prospects within countries such as the
United States. In March 1998, using about $229,000 of government funds, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in collaboration with Delta and Pine
Land Company (the largest producer of cotton seeds with a seventy-three
percent market share), received a patent for a genetic "technology protection
system"'33 that makes it possible for seed companies to sell seeds that will work
only for a single growing season. Crops will grow, but their seeds will be
unable to germinate. This marks a radical break with farming traditions
worldwide-the practice of farmers saving seeds from one growing season to
the next.
In South America, poor farmers use knowledge passed down
over centuries to select seeds best suited to the local climate
and soil. Across the equator their counterparts in South
Dakota do it too; 80 to 90 percent of wheat farmers there save
seeds from harvest .... Seed saving may be good for farmers,
but it's not good for the chemical and seed companies who are
spending billions to develop genetically engineered seed
varieties. Although a 1970 law permits U.S. farmers to save
proprietary seeds for use on their own farms, companies
selling genetically engineered varieties now say that farmers
must not reuse their patented varieties at all. They say they
can't make ends meet unless farmers pay each and every
season.
Biotech seed companies have managed to control the
"problem" of seed saving in this country by policing farmers.
can these companies continue spending millions to
develop new high-tech seeds if they can't reach the millions of
farmers in the untapped markets of China, India, Pakistan,
South America?
...How

USDA to the rescue. "The need was there to come up with a
system that allowed you to self-police your technology, other
than trying to put on laws and legal barriers to farmers saving

133. See U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 (Mar. 3, 1998) (for Control of Plant Gene Expression; Assignee:
Delta and Pine Land Co. and the United States Department of Agriculture).
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seed, and to try and stop foreign interests from stealing the
technology," says USDA Scientist Melvin Oliver, the primary
inventor ofthe new patent-protecting technology. Oliver says
the invention is a way to "put billions of dollars spent on
research back into the system."' 34
Oliver's "invention" covers both transgenic and ordinary varieties of seeds
and could even be applied to self-pollinating varieties of wheat, oat, and rice.
With this technology, farmers growing those varieties would have to buy new
seed every year. Monsanto, Pioneer, Hi-Bred, and Novartis, and other seed
companies have already taken licenses on the "Terminator"
technology-licensing revenue is expected to be approximately two million
dollars a year to the USDA and Delta and Pine. In May 1998, Monsanto
acquired control of Delta and Pine. This technology may be seen as:
A threat to millions of resource-poor farmers who depend on
saving seeds, and exchanging seed with their neighbors, for
their livelihood. .

.

.

Since the technology will enable

multinational seed companies to enter Second and Third World
markets, there is also the fear that greater amounts of identical
crops will be grown worldwide, increasing monocropping and
further eroding agricultural biodiversity"'

134. Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business: A New "Terminator" Technology Will Make CropsSterileand
ForceFarmersto Buy Seeds More Often-So Why Didthe U.S.D.A. Invent It?, MOTHER JONES ONLINE, (Apr.
7, 1998) at <http://www.mojones.connews wire/broydo.html>.
135. Id.; interestingly, Monsanto Co. announced in May 1998 that it bought DeKalb Genetics Corp. for
$2.3 billion and Delta & Pine Land Co. (and presumably the Terminator patent) for $1.9 billion. See Scott
Kilman, Monsanto Buys Two Companiesfor $4.2 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1998, at A2:
Though expensive, the acquisitions would give Monsanto an army that rivals the muscle
of the biotechnology alliance formed last year between DuPont Co. and pioneer Hi-Bred
International Inc.... The upshot is that some of the most important types of crop
technology are dominated by two companies: Monsanto and DuPont, a Wilimington,
Del., Chemicals giant.... The huge premiums paid by Monsanto reflect the intense
race by the globe's chemical giants to build businesses that can exploit their expanding
knowledge about genetic engineering of plants.... DeKalb Genetics was the last big
U.S. seed company available for purchase; it controls 11% of the lucrative North
American corn-seed market [holding a patent] for genetically engineering acorn plant
to make an insecticide that is harmless to humans. U.S. farmers are planting about 12
million acres with the seed this spring.
See also Scott Kilman & Susan Warren, Old Rivals Fightfor New Turf-Biotech Crops, WALL ST. J., May 27,
1998, at BI:
In the three years since the first transgenic seeds were introduced, crop biotechnology

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:11

In another related example, Monsanto, a multinational agrochemical
corporation based in the United States, recently genetically engineered and
patented soybean and cotton seeds amenable to direct applications of another
patented Monsanto product, a broad-spectrum herbicide, ROUNDUP. These
seeds are called ROUNDUP READY, but they have an additional
characteristic: crops will die ifthey are sprayed with broad-spectrum herbicides
manufactured by other companies.36 Other agrochemical multinational
corporations are getting into the act as well. Plant patents have been granted
to varieties of crop plants that are resistant to Ciba-Geigy's ATRAZINE
herbicide and DuPont's GIST and GLEAN-it is easier (and cheaper) via
genetic engineering to make the crop fit the chemical herbicide or pesticide than
vice versa. A new crop variety may cost two million dollars to develop and
patent, but a new herbicide may cost more than forty million dollars."'
Monsanto's ROUNDUP READY cotton comprises about three million
acres of the fourteen million acres of U.S. cotton crop. Use of a Monsanto
brand cotton guarantees use of a Monsanto-brand herbicide-good for
corporate profits, but not so good for genomic crop diversity. In the summer
of 1997, the three million acres of Monsanto-brand suffered a catastrophic crop

has grown from a young science to a hot business: About halfofU.S. cotton fields, 40%
of soybean fields and 20% of corn fields are genetically altered. Now, in a stunningly
swift concentration of power, much of the design, harvest and processing ofgenetically
engineered crops is coming under [Monsanto and DuPonfs] influence.... Monsanto
alone stands to control a staggering 80% of the U.S. cotton-seed market, if pending
transactions win regulatory approval.... Seeds equipped with Monsanto genes are
being planted around the globe this year on roughly 55 million acres-roughly the size
of all the farmland in Iowa and Illinois. But DuPont has more patents for the [next] and potentially far more valuable - wave, which involves changing plants' nutritional
attributes... [such as] instructing soybeans to make more of a natural compound that
might fight cancer, or making corn that reduces the amount of saturated fat in the eggs
of the chickens that eat it.... Monsanto [has formed] a joint venture with the grainprocessing behemoth Cargill Inc.... [which is] America's biggest closely held company,
with fiscal 1997 sales of $56 billion .... The shrinking number of independent seed
companies is making U.S. farm organizations nervous, and public interest groups are
complaining to the Clinton administration officials. Monsanto and DuPont "have a
choke hold on germ plasm," or the reproductive cells in plants, says Margaret Mellon
of the Union of Concerned Scientists, an activist group.
136. See Mark Arax, No Way Around Roundup: Monsanto's BioengineeredSeeds Are Designed to
1997),
Require More of the Company's Herbicide, MOTHER JONES, (Jan.-Feb.
<http://bsd.mojones.com/motherjones/JF97/brokaw.html>; Robert Steyer, Monsanto Gets Green Light on
Altered Soybeans, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 26, 1995, at 13D; See generally Karen Lehman & Al
Krebs, Controlof the World's Food Supply, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supranote 6, at
122.
137. Vandana Shiva, MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND, PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSrrY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 112 (1993).
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failure. The cause ofthe failure was unclear. Monsanto also sells a genetically
engineered variety of cotton called BOLLGARD that was bioengineered with
Bacillus thurengesisDNA to produce proteins that were toxic to the bollworm;
however, BOLLGARD cotton ended up having twenty to fifty times the normal
level of bollworm infestation. However, to the extent that the use of patented
seed stock such as ROUNDUP READY or BOLLGARD become widespread,
farmers who use such stock must sign restrictive licensing agreements wherein
they agree to terms such as allowing Monsanto to inspect their fields, to use
only Monsanto-brand herbicides and not to save seed for further planting-all
of which contribute to both further centralization ofagribusiness and increasing
as well as potentially disastrous dependence on vulnerable monocultured seed
stock (ten seed companies control about forty percent of the commercial seed
market' 38)-results that some have referred to as "bioserfdom" underwritten by
our intellectual property laws.' 39
CONCLUSION

This Article has briefly raised questions about the emerging globalized
vision of intellectual property protection embedded in multilateral agreements
such as the TRIPS component of GATT. In particular, there are serious
distributive questions about the international political economy of intellectual
property protection as between the "have" and "have-not" nations that should
be addressed sooner rather than later. Additionally, on both national and
international levels, the question of constructing and maintaining an intellectual
public domain or commons remains extremely important, if only because the
unprecedented grab by intellectual property owners of the developed nations of
the North seems to be imminent. This grabbing obscures traditional
understanding (at least within the Anglo-American intellectual property
tradition) that intellectual property law is about striking a vital and important
balance between the rights of authors and inventors and the public of consumers
and users as well as the fact that all intellectual property owners are also users.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, what are we to make ofthe massive
and generally uncompensated flow of cultural and biological resources out of

138. Broydo, supra note 134, at 56.
139. See Verlyn Klinkenbarg, Biotechnologyand the FutureofAgriculture, N.Y. TmES, Dec. 8,1997,
at.A24.
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the developing and least developed nations of the South (where they are
characterized as "raw materials" or "naturally occurring") into the laboratories,
universities, and factories ofthe developed nations of the North and emerge as
strongly-protected and economically valuable intellectual properties, protected
against "pirates" ofthe developing nations by multilateral intellectual property
agreements? At the very least, it is becoming increasingly clear that, whether
on the domestic or international level, the vicious circle of increasingly strong
(and virtually automatic) intellectual property protection comes with some
serious costs on both the local and global levels and deserves to be addressed
now.

